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TRANSFER AND CHOICE OF FEDERAL 
LAW: THE APPELLATE MODEL 
Robert A. Ragazzo* 
Choice of law questions are among the most complicated in the 
American procedural system. In cases in which state law supplies 
the rule of decision, the laws of fifty sovereigns are potentially ap-
plicable to every dispute. State courts employ choice of law rules to 
determine which state's law governs a particular controversy.1 Fed-
eral district courts exercising diversity jurisdiction employ the same 
choice of law rules as the courts of the state in which they are 
located.2 · 
The choice of law problem is complicated by transfers of cases 
from one district court to another within the federal system.3 In 
Van Dusen v. Barrack, 4 the United States Supreme Court held that 
after the transfer of a diversity case on the defendant's motion from 
a court that had the power to entertain the action, the transferee 
court should apply the same law that the transferor court would 
have applied.s This article considers whether and to what extent 
the Van Dusen rule should apply to transferred cases containing 
federal issues. 
For illustrative purposes, assume that a plaintiff brings an action 
pursuant to section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,6 
and Rule 14a-9 promulgated thereunder,7 and alleges that the de-
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center. B.A. 1982, Fordham; 
J.D. 1985, Harvard. - Ed. The author wishes to thank Seth Chandler, David Dow, Dennis 
Duffy, Miguel Estrada, Laura Oren, Yale Rosenberg, Eugene Smith, and William P. Streng 
for their thoughtful comments. The author also wishes to thank Judith Anthony, Mark Ben-
nett, Christina Rouleau, Bethany Fitch, Shennie Patel, and Kevin Peter for their research 
assistance. 
1. See infra section III.A. 
2. See infra text accompanying notes 165-67. 
3. The difficulty of determining the proper effect of transfer upon choice of law is elo-
quently demonstrated by the change of views of one eminent commentator within a five-year 
period. Compare Brainerd Currie, Change of Venue and the Conflict of Laws, 22 U. Cm. L 
REv. 405, 501-03 (1955) [hereinafter Currie, Change of Venue] (supporting the application of 
federal choice of law principles in transferred state law cases) with Brainerd Currie, Change 
of Venue and the Conflict of Laws: A Retraction, 27 U. Cm. L. REv. 341, 348 (1960) (arguing 
that transferor state law should apply). 
4. 376 U.S. 612 (1964). 
5. See infra section I.B.1. 
6. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1988). 
7. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 {1994). 
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fendant negligently committed fraud in connection with a proxy so-
licitation. The plaintiff files a lawsuit in the United States District 
Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiff chooses 
this court because it lies within the Second Circuit, which permits 
negligence actions under section 14(a).8 In light of the broad juris-
dictional and venue rules that apply to securities fraud actions, the 
Southern District of New York is a proper forum.9 The court then 
transfers the case to the United States District Court for the North-
ern District of Ohio, which lies within the Sixth Circuit. The Sixth 
Circuit has held that section 14(a) requires proof of scienter.10 
Should the Northern District of Ohio apply the law of the Second 
or the Sixth Circuit? The plaintiff's ability to proceed with the case 
depends on the answer to this question. 
Among the early cases, two lines of authority developed. Prior 
to Van Dusen, federal courts considered whether to transfer cases 
containing federal issues to circuits that interpreted federal law less 
favorably from the plaintiff's perspective. These courts generally 
assumed that transferee federal law would apply and held that an 
unfavorable change of law from the plaintiff's perspective did not 
prevent a transfer.11 After Van Dusen, federal courts continued to 
take the view that transferee federal law applies after a permanent 
transfer pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).12 
Four years after Van Dusen, Congress passed the Multidistrict 
Litigation Act (MDL Act).13 The MDL Act allowed the Judicial 
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (JPML) to consolidate cases for 
8. See Wtlson v. Great Am. Indus., 855 F.2d 987, 995 (2d Cir. 1988); Gerstle v. Gamble-
Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1298-1301 (2d Cir. 1973). 
9. See 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1988); Busch v. Buchman, Buchman & O'Brien, 11 F.3d 1255, 
1256-58 {5th Cir. 1994) (noting that under the Securities Exchange Act, service of process is 
nationwide); Conover v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 794 F.2d 520, 527 (9th Cir. 1986) (not-
ing that under the Securities Exchange Act, venue lies in any district where any portion of 
the defendant's illegal conduct occurred), vacated on other grounds, 482 U.S. 923 (1987). 
10. See Adams v. Standard Knitting Mills, Inc., 623 F.2d 422, 428-31 (6th Cir.), cert. de· 
nied, 449 U.S. 1067 (1980). 
11. See infra section 11.A.1. 
12. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1988); see infra note 149 and accompanying text. Section 1404(a) 
transfers are premised on the propriety of the original venue. If the original venue is im· 
proper, transfer is accomplished pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) {1988). Section 1406 trans-
fers pose no choice of law problems. If the original venue is improper, the plaintiff's act of 
filing cannot establish a choice of law baseline for subsequent proceedings. It is well ac-
cepted that transferee law applies after § 1406 transfers. See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. 
Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 243 & n.8 (1981); Nelson v. International Paint Co., 716 F.2d 640, 643-
44 {9th Cir. 1983); Ellis v. Great S.W. Corp., 646 F.2d 1099, 1109-11 (5th Cir. 1981). Conse-
quently, references in this article to permanent transfers are to§ 1404(a) transfers. 
13. Pub. L. No. 90-296, § 1, 82 Stat. 109 {1968) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1407 
(1988)). 
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pretrial proceedings.14 The MDL Act contemplated that trans-
ferred cases would be remanded to their original fora after the com-
pletion of pretrial proceedings.15 MDL transferee courts, relying 
on Van Dusen with little analysis, applied transferor law on federal 
issues. These courts neglected to consider whether the Van Dusen 
rule should apply to federal issues and what difference, if any, the 
MDL posture of the case made.16 
Thus, in the early 1980s it was well established that transferee 
federal law applies after permanent transfers and transferor federal 
law applies after MDL transfers. Then, in 1984, Professor Richard 
Marcus wrote a seminal article on transfer and choice of federal 
law.17 Marcus viewed Van Dusen as based on federalism considera-
tions that were irrelevant in the federal issue context.18 He argued 
that every federal judge has the ability and the duty to determine 
the content of federal law independently, without regard to the po-
sitions judges in other federal circuits have taken. Marcus called 
this conclusion the principle of competence.19 Based on this princi-
ple, Marcus argued that a district court should apply the law of its 
own circuit after both MDL and permanent transfers.20 
In In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of September 1, 1983,21 which 
involved an MDL transfer, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia Circuit became the first court to consider 
in depth the effect of transfer on choice of federal law. Relying 
heavily on Marcus's analysis and his principle of competence, the 
court held that transferee federal law should apply. The court con-
sidered whether there was any reason to distinguish MDL transfers 
from permanent transfers and held, as Marcus had suggested, that 
there was not.22 Korean Air Lines changed the legal landscape. 
Although Korean Air Lines confirmed the view that transferee fed-
eral law applies after permanent transfers, it repudiated the view 
that transferor law applies after MDL transfers. Other courts have 
14. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1988). 
15. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1988). 
16. See infra section 11.A.2. 
17. See Richard L. Marcus, Conflicts Among Circuits and Transfers Within the Federal 
Judicial System, 93 YALE LI. 677 (1984). 
18. See id. at 693-701; see also infra text accompanying notes 160-68. 
19. See Marcus, supra note 17, at 702-09; see also infra text accompanying notes 169-70. 
20. See Marcus, supra note 17, at 709-19; see also infra text accompanying note 171. 
21. 829 F.2d 1171 (D.C. Cir. 1987), affd. sub nom. Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 
U.S. 122 (1989). 
22. 829 F.2d at 1174-76; see also infra section Il.C. 
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uniformly followed Korean Air Lines in both contexts.23 As a con-
sequence, the federal courts are approaching a new consensus that 
transferee federal law applies regardless of the type of transfer. 
Recent commentators have challenged Marcus's views and the 
Korean Air Lines case and have urged that transferor law should 
govern federal issues after both MDL24 and permanentzs transfers. 
The Marcus article and the Korean Air Lines decision have also 
been undercut to some extent by the Supreme Court's decision in 
Ferens v. John Deere Co.,26 which held that after the transfer of a 
diversity case on the plaintiff's motion, transferor law continues to 
apply on state law issues. The Court viewed Van Dusen as protect-
ing more than federalism concerns. It believed that Van Dusen was 
also based on the desirability of divorcing transfer decisions from 
choice of law considerations and preserving whatever advantages 
are entailed in the plaintiff's right to pick the forum.27 
In light of recent developments, a reexamination of the position 
that transferee federal law applies regardless of the context is in 
order. This article argues that the consensus that existed prior to 
the Marcus article and the Korean Air Lines case, although not 
based upon the most thorough analysis, comprises the better view: 
transferee federal law should apply after permanent but not MDL 
transfers. 
Part I of this article examines the Supreme Court's precedents 
in the analogous forum non conveniens and diversity transfer con-
texts. Part II examines relevant legal developments with regard to 
the transfer of cases containing federal issues. Part III considers 
which law should apply after the permanent transfer of a case con-
taining federal issues and concludes, consistent with the weight of 
authority, that transferee federal law should apply. Part III, how-
ever, supplies a different rationale for this result than the currently 
prevailing view. In the absence of controlling Supreme Court au-
thority, when a case containing federal issues is commenced in fed-
eral court, a district court does not ask which circuit deserves to 
have its law applied or utilize any choice of law principle. A district 
court applies tbe law of its circuit because its circuit court is the 
23. See infra section 11.D. 
24. See, e.g., Ross Daryl Cooper, The D.C. Circuit Review, September 1987 - August 1988, 
The Korean Air Disaster: Choice of Law in Federal Multidistrict Litigation, 51 GEO. WASH. L. 
REv. 1145 (1989). 
25. See, e.g., Tom M. Fmi, Note, The Scope of the Van Dusen Rule in Federal-Question 
Transfers, 1992/1993 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 49. 
26. 494 U.S. 516 (1990). 
27. 494 U.S. at 524-30; see also infra section I.B.3. 
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next-higher court in the federal hierarchy - the court that will re-
view its decisions. After a permanent transfer, a transferee district 
court should continue to apply the law of its circuit on federal issues 
because its circuit, rather than the transferor circuit, has appellate 
jurisdiction over the case. I call this view the "appellate model." 
Part ID also concludes that Van Dusen and Ferens do not require a 
departure from the appellate model. 
Although the appellate model reaches the same result as the 
prevailing weight of authority in the permanent transfer context, it 
reaches a different result in the MDL context. Part IV argues that 
after an MDL transfer the transferee court should continue to apply 
transferor federal law. The MDL scheme contemplates that at the 
conclusion of pretrial proceedings, cases will be remanded to their 
original fora for trial. As a consequence, any appeal after remand, 
trial, and final judgment will be to the transferor court of appeals, 
and the MDL district court should apply that circuit's law. 
I. ANALOGOUS SUPREME COURT AUTHORITY 
At present, the Supreme Court has not addressed the effect of 
transfer on the law applicable _to federal issues. Any relevant 
Supreme Court learning must be derived from the Court's decisions 
in the forum non conveniens and diversity transfer contexts. These 
cases suggest that the plaintiff has a privilege in the forum selection 
process that includes the right to influence choice of law. This 
choice of law advantage is viewed as a vested right that should not 
be disturbed by transfer. Part I examines the plaintiff's venue and 
choice of law privileges and their potential application to the fed-
eral issue context. 
A. The Plaintiff's Venue Privilege 
The Supreme Court explicitly endorsed a plaintiff's venue privi-
lege in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert. 28 Prior to 1948, transfers within 
the federal system were impossible. In Gulf Oil, the Supreme 
Court affirmed the dismissal of a case pursuant to the common law 
doctrine of forum non conveniens so that a lawsuit legitimately 
brought in one federal district could be tried in another.29 As a 
28. 330 U.S. 501, 507-08 (1947). 
29. See 330 U.S. at 505-12. The Gulf Oil decision has been questioned on the ground that 
forum non conveniens dismissals are inappropriate if the plaintiff has chosen a legitimate 
forum. Cf. Currie, Change of Venue, supra note 3, at 420-34 (arguing that forum non con-
veniens dismissals are inappropriate, even in the absence of transfer provisions, when the 
alternate forum lies within the federal system); Allan R. Stein, Forum Non Conveniens and 
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consequence, for a short time the forum non conveniens doctrine 
served as a proxy for transfer.3o 
The Gulf Oil Court identified two categories of factors that are 
relevant in ruling on forum non conveniens motions. First, the dis-
trict court must consider private interest factors, which include ac-
cess to sources of proof, availability and cost of securing the 
attendance of witnesses, potential for viewing premises, ability to 
enforce any judgment, relative obstacles and advantages to a fair 
trial, and "all other practical problems that make trial of a case 
easy, expeditious and inexpensive."31 Second, the district court 
must consider public interest factors, such as preventing docket 
congestion, limiting the burden of jury duty to communities with a 
relation to the litigation, making it possible for citizens to view pro-
ceedings with an impact on their communities, and holding the trial 
of a diversity case before a judge conversant with local law,32 
In applying this multifactor balancing test, the Court noted that 
the plaintiff's choice of forum is entitled to great respect: "[U]nless 
the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff's 
choice of forum should rarely be disturbed."33 Because forum non 
conveniens and transfer decisions are analogous, the Gulf Oil fac-
tors apply in the transfer context. However, because transfer in-
volves less significant consequences to the plaintiff than a forum 
non conveniens dismissal, a lesser showing of inconvenience is re-
the Redundancy of Court-Access Doctrine, 133 U. PA. L. Rev. 781, 841-46 (1985) (arguing 
that forum non conveniens should be replaced by more stringent standards for jurisdiction). 
30. In 1948, in response to the problems posed by Gulf Oil, Congress passed the first 
statute allowing transfer from one legitimate federal forum to another "[f]or the convenience · 
of parties and witnesses" and "in the interest of justice." Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 
80-773, 62 Stat. 937 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1988)). Federal courts now 
employ the forum non conveniens doctrine only when the alternative venue lies beyond the 
federal system. See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981). 
31. 330 U.S. at 508. 
32. 330 U.S. at 508-09. One commentator has suggested that the Gulf Oil factors are 
often disregarded. See Peter G. McAllen, Deference to the Plaintiff in Forum Non Con· 
veniens, 13 S. Ju.. U. LJ. 191, 239-42 (1989). 
33. 330 U.S. at 508. On the specific facts before it, the Court held that the district court 
did not err in finding that Gulf Oil was "one of those rather rare cases where the [forum non 
conveniens] doctrine should be applied." 330 U.S. at 509. Respect for the plaintiff's original 
choice of venue may have decreased over time. See Edmund W. Kitch, Section 1404( a) of the 
Judicial Code: In the Interest of Justice or Injustice, 40 IND. W. 99, 101 (1965) (observing that 
district courts "have granted transfer on a steadily decreasing showing of inconvenience"); 
McAllen, supra note 32, at 240 (identifying a " 'liberal trend' in forum non conveniens" ac-
cording to which "courts are becoming more likely to grant a dismissal on the basis of a 
particular showing of inconvenience than they would have been in years past"); Stein, supra 
note 29, at 831 (noting a "dramatic increase in the use of forum non conveniens" between 
1965 and 1985). 
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quired to obtain transfer.34 As a result, the plaintiff's venue privi-
lege continues to be recognized in the transfer context but has less 
weight than in the forum non conveniens context.35 
One may fairly question why the plaintiff should have a right 
superior to the defendant to influence venue. Although some com-
mentators have tried to justify this right based on characteristics 
that distinguish plaintiffs from defendants,36 the plaintiff's venue 
privilege is best explained as an efficiency mechanism.37 The legis-
lature creates rules of subject matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdic-
tion, and venue that limit potential fora but often identify more 
than one forum as proper. Some actor must decide which of these 
34. See, e.g., Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 32 (1955) (finding that Congress in-
tended the phrase "[fjor the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice" 
in§ 1404(a) to allow courts to grant transfers upon a lesser showing of inconvenience than 
traditionally required under a forum non conveniens analysis). 
35. See, e.g., 349 U.S. at 32; Club Assistance Program, Inc. v. Zukerman, 598 F. Supp. 734, 
736 (N.D. Ill. 1984) ("[P]Iaintiff's forum selection is significantly less weighty under Section 
1404(a) than under forum non conveniens."); Air Express Intl. Corp. v. Consolidated 
Freightways, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 889, 891 (D. Conn. 1984) (stating that under § 1404(a) plain-
tiff's choice of forum is controlling absent a showing of inconvenience); Cheeseman v. carey, 
485 F. Supp. 203, 215 (S.D.N.Y.) ("[P]laintiff's choice of forum is entitled to respect ••.• "), 
affd. on other grounds, 623 F.2d 1387 (2d Cir. 1980); see also Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Geogra-
phy as a Litigation Weapon: Consumers, Forum-Selection Clauses, and the Rehnquist Court, 
40 UCLA L. REv. 423, 512 (1992) (arguing that in enacting§ 1404(a), Congress intended that 
courts give substantial deference to the plaintiff's initial choice of forum). Given the flexible 
nature of the Gulf Oil analysis, it is not surprising that there is a large variance in how much 
deference particular courts give to the plaintiff's choice of forum. See David E. Steinberg, 
The Motion to Transfer and the Interests of Justice, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 443, 488-94 
(1990). . 
36. See, e.g., David E. Seidelson, Jurisdiction of Federal Courts Hearing Federal Cases: 
An Examination of the Propriety of the Limitations Imposed by Venue Restrictions, 37 GEo. 
WASH. L. REv. 82, 85 (1968) (arguing that the plaintiff's venue privilege flows from the 
presumption that the plaintiff has been wronged by the defendant); Fini, supra note 25, at 53 
(attempting to justify the plaintiff's venue privilege on the grounds that the plaintiff is the 
party who has allegedly been wronged and defendants have more resources to litigate in 
inconvenient fora than plaintiffs); Stowell R.R. Kelner, Note, "Adrift on an Uncharted Sea": 
A Survey of Section 1404(a) Transfer in the Federal System, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 612, 639-40 
(1992) (supporting a plaintiff's venue privilege because "for any adjudicatory system to work 
••• it must •.• attract potential plaintiffs"); see also Louise Weinberg, Choice of Law and 
Minimal Scrutiny, 49 U. CHI. L. REv. 440, 464 (1982) (arguing that the pro-plaintiff bias of 
the venue and choice of law system flows from an attempt "to regulate a great common 
market and to rationalize a stubborn federalism"). 
37. Professor McAllen argues persuasively: 
The only identifiable characteristic that plaintiffs all share is that they chose to institute 
litigation. Some are wealthier than the defendants they sue, some are poorer. Some 
seek affirmative relief, others seek declaratory relief. Some claim to be victims, others 
claim not to have victimized. Some are individuals, some are corporations, some are 
governments or government agencies. It makes no more sense to confer a substantive 
law advantage on all plaintiffs than it would to confer a similar advantage on all who 
happened to wear blue last Tuesday. 
McAllen, supra note 32, at 237 n.222; see also Kelner, supra note 36, at 618-22 (summarizing 
case law and pointing out that the courts have not thought this problem through clearly). 
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proper fora will hear the lawsuit.38 Allowing the parties to select 
the venue rather than the judge saves systemic resources.39 Al-
lowing the plaintiff to select the venue rather than the defendant is 
more efficient because it involves fewer steps and does not require 
communication between the parties prior to the filing of a lawsuit.40 
The presumption in favor of the plaintiff's initial choice of venue 
prevents reconsideration except in extreme cases. Any other rule 
would eliminate the efficiency gains inherent in removing the judi-
cial system from the initial forum selection process.41 
Thus, the plaintiff's venue privilege is well founded.42 One ad-
vantage this privilege confers on plaintiffs is the ability to influence 
the choice of state law.43 Whether the plaintiff should retain this 
choice of law advantage if the venue changes is the subject of the 
next section. 
B. The Plaintiff's Choice of Law Privilege 
1. Van Dusen v. Barrack 
In Van Dusen v. Barrack, 44 the Supreme Court broadened the 
plaintiff's venue privilege to include a choice of law privilege.45 In 
Van Dusen, the Court held that transferor state law applies after the 
permanent transfer of a diversity case on the defendant's motion.46 
Two distinct strands of reasoning support this holding. The 
Supreme Court viewed the plaintiff as having a privilege to pick the 
initial forum - a privilege that confers certain vested rights upon 
the plaintiff, including the ability to influence the choice of state 
law. The Court believed that transfer should not disturb this privi-
38. See McAllen, supra note 32, at 242-51 (considering the models of judicial choice, 
plaintiff's choice, and defendant's choice). 
39. See id. at 247. 
40. See id. at 248-49 & n.264 (noting that the defendant's choice model would require 
procedures intervening between the plaintiff's decision to sue and the defendant's choice of 
forum). 
41. See id. at 244-51; see also Earl M. Maltz, Choice of Forum and Choice of Law in the 
Federal Courts: A Reconsideration of Erie Principles, 79 KY. W. 231, 249 (1990-91) ("If the 
presumption in favor of the plaintiff's choice is strong, the forum non conveniens inquiry will 
consume relatively few resources •••• "). 
42. But see Stein, supra note 29, at 816-17, 844-46 (arguing that the plaintiff's venue 
privilege is a vestige of a time when rules of personal jurisdiction sharply limited the plain-
tiff's choice of fora and that this privilege should be eliminated in light of modem jurisdic-
tional theory). 
43. See infra text accompanying notes 203-07. 
44. 376 U.S. 612 (1964). 
45. See also Fmi, supra note 25, at 53 (arguing that the plaintiff's venue privilege often 
includes a choice of law privilege). 
46. See 376 U.S. at 626-40. 
. . 
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lege. The Court also rested its holding on federalism grounds and 
on the policies underlying Erie Railroad v. Tompkins. 47 Both 
strands of analysis are considered below. 
The Van Dusen Court advanced two rationales for its holding 
that are premised on the notion that the plaintiff ~s venue privilege 
includes a choice of law privilege. First, the Supreme Court evinced 
concern that allowing transfer to change the applicable law would 
prejudice the plaintiff.48 The Court was disturbed that in some 
cases the transferee forum would refuse to entertain claims that 
would have been actionable in the transferor forum.49 In such cir-
cumstances, a transfer motion would be the functional equivalent of 
a motion to dismiss. The Court noted that transfers, like forum non 
conveniens dismissals,5o had previously been granted with condi-
tions that allowed the action to proceed in the transferee forum.51 
Applying transferor law removes any concern that changing the ap-
plicable law will prejudice the plaintiff and dispenses with the need 
for conditional transfers.52 
In this regard, the Supreme Court examined "the history and 
purposes of§ 1404(a)" and found that the transfer statute "should 
be regarded as a federal judicial housekeeping measure, dealing 
with the placement of litigation in the federal courts and generally 
intended, on the basis of convenience and fairness, simply to au-
thorize a change of courtrooms."53 In the Court's view, the transfer 
statute "was not designed to narrow the plaintiff's venue privilege 
or to defeat the state-law advantages that might accrue from the 
exercise of this venue privilege."54 
Second, the Court noted that applying transferor law allows dis-
trict courts to decide transfer questions based on efficiency consid-
erations unhindered by concerns regarding a change in the 
47. 304 U.S. 64 {1938). 
48. See 376 U.S. at 628-30. 
49. See 376 U.S. at 629-30. 
50. See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 242 (1981) (noting that in making 
a forum non conveniens motion, defendants agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of the alter-
native forum and waive any statute of limitations defense); Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 
364 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (noting that to obtain forum non conveniens dismis-
sals, defendants often agree to waive jurisdictional objections); McAllen, supra note 32, at 
205 (noting that courts have conditioned forum non conveniens dismissal on the defendant's 
promise to waive objections to personal jurisdiction, ·venue, or timeliness, to permit discovery 
to proceed under the rules of the original forum, and to pay any judgment). 
51. See 376 U.S. at 630-31 & n.27. 
52. 376 U.S. at 630-31. 
53. 376 U.S. at 636-37. 
54. 376 U.S. at 635 . 
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applicable law.ss Section 1404(a) requires district courts to consider 
"the convenience of parties and witnesses" and "the interest of jus-
tice" in deciding transfer motions.s6 Were a change of venue to re-
sult in a change in law, district courts would have to consider 
whether prejudice to the plaintiff requires a denial of transfer based 
on the interest of justice in some cases in which convenience factors 
weighed in favor of transfer. The Van Dusen rule obviates the need 
for this inquiry.s7 
Although the Supreme Court did not explicitly endorse a plain-
tiff's choice of law privilege, each of the above rationales implies 
such a privilege. Each rationale makes sense only if the plaintiff, 
through the initial choice of forum, has the right to establish a 
choice of law baseline that is entitled to respect from the courts. 
Prejudice implies more than detrimental change. Prejudice implies 
the loss of vested rights. If the plaintiff lacks a choice of law privi-
lege, a transfer would not be prejudicial even if the transferee fo-
rum would not recognize, or would apply less favorable law to, the 
plaintiff's claim.ss The plaintiff is prejudiced only if the initial 
choice of venue results in an entitlement to lock in the law applica-
ble to the claim regardless of transfer. 
The Van Dusen Court's notion that courts should base transfer 
decisions solely on efficiency considerations also implies the exist-
ence of a plaintiff's choice of law privilege. Applying transferor law 
is one way to accomplish this result. The Court could as easily have 
held, however, that transferee law applies but that a change in law 
is entitled to no weight in the transfer calculus.s9 Using the former 
approach to protect the core concerns of section 1404(a) can only 
be justified by an independent principle valuing the plaintiff's right 
to influence applicable law. 
The legitimacy of the Supreme Court's assumption that the 
plaintiff is entitled to a greater opportunity than the defendant to 
influence choice of law is questionable. Such a right is not inherent 
in the plaintiff's venue privilege. That privilege rests on grounds 
that are systemic and value neutral. The plaintiff is granted the 
venue privilege for efficiency reasons, not because the plaintiff is 
55. 376 U.S. at 636. 
56. 28 U.S.C: § 1404{a) (1988). 
57. See 376 U.S. at 636. 
58. The cases applying transferee federal law have proceeded in part on this theory. See 
infra text accompanying notes 136-45. 
59. The Supreme Court in the forum non conveniens context, see infra text accompanying 
notes 92-97, and the lower federal courts in the federal issue transfer context, see infra text 
accompanying notes 146-48, have adopted this approach. 
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more deserving than the defendant with respect to venue considera-
tions. Despite these efficiency concerns, the plaintiff's right to 
choose the forum is not absolute. Given the right circumstances, 
defendants may remove state cases to federal court,60 transfer cases 
within the federal system,61 and have cases dismissed on forum non 
conveniens grounds. 62 If the defendant succeeds in vetoing the 
plaintiff's choice of forum, there is no venue-related reason why 
any choice of law advantage the plaintiff might otherwise have had 
should be retained. 
Certain plaintiff advantages tied to forum selection evaporate if 
the defendant is successful in changing the forum. A plaintiff may 
file in state court to impose more limited discovery on the defend-
ant than the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would allow. If the 
defendant succeeds in removing the case, however, the Federal 
Rules, with their broad discovery provisions, will apply and the 
plaintiff will lose any discovery advantage. 63 The plaintiff may file 
in federal court in one region of tQ.e country in an attempt to influ-
ence the values of the judge or jury. Yet, if the defendant succeeds 
in having the case transferred to a federal court in another region of 
the country, the plaintiff will lose any regional advantage.64 A fo-
rum non conveniens dismissal always has the effect of relegating the 
plaintiff to the law of another forum.65 The interesting question is 
what, if anything, distinguishes choice of law in the transfer context 
from other advantages the plaintiff loses upon change of forum.66 
60. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1988) (allowing defendants to remove cases that are within 
the district court's original jurisdiction). 
61. See supra note 30. 
62. See supra text accompanying notes 31-35. 
63. See Satellite Fm. Planning Corp. v. First Natl. Bank, 633 F. Supp. 386, 394 & n.9 (D. 
Del. 1986). The broad federal discovery provisions, see F'Bo. R. CIV. P. 26-37, are often a 
significant factor in causing parties to choose federal over state court. See, e.g., Jerry 
Goldman & Kenneth S. Marks, Diversity Jurisdiction and Local Bias: A Preliminary Empiri-
cal Inquiry, 9 J. LEGAL Sron. 93, 98 (1980) (finding that 57% of attorneys surveyed cited the 
superior rules of discovery as a reason for choosing federal court). Once a party removes the 
case to federal district court, applicable federal rules will displace any conflicting state proce-
dural rules. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467-74 (1965). 
64. For example, in Gulf Oil the plaintiff filed in federal court in New York, rather than 
in Virginia where all events relevant to the litigation occurred, because the plaintiff believed 
that a New York jury would be more comfortable in awarding the $400,000 sought by the 
plaintiff. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 510 (1947). After the Supreme Court 
affirmed a forum non conveniens dismissal to force the plaintiff to proceed in the Vrrginia 
forum, the potential advantage of trying the case in front of a metropolitan jury was irretriev-
ably lost. See also Henderson v. American Airlines, Inc., 91 F. Supp. 191 (S.D.N.Y.-1950) 
(transferring a case challenging the provision of racially separate facilities in a Kentucky 
airport to the Eastern District of Kentucky). 
65. See infra text accompanying notes 96-97. 
66. See Satellite, 633 F. Supp. at 394 (analogizing the elimination of the plaintiff's choice 
of law privilege on transfer to the tactical advantages the defendant gains on removal). 
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1\vo strong arguments suggest that any choice of law advantage 
accruing to the plaintiff should not survive once the defendant suc-
cessfully challenges the initial venue choice. Because of the pre-
sumption in favor of the plaintiff's venue choice, the defendant will 
be able to justify a transfer only in extreme cases. The fact that the 
plaintiff has picked a forum that is so inconvenient that transfer is 
justified suggests that the plaintiff has engaged in manipulative or 
vexatious behavior that the system should not tolerate. It is hard to 
justify encouraging such behavior by granting the plaintiff a choice 
of law privilege that survives transfer.67 
There is, moreover, some overlap between venue and choice of 
law considerations. To some extent, both depend on the center of 
gravity of events. Thus, if the original forum is inappropriate, it is 
likely that transferor law is also inappropriate. The Gulf Oil factors 
are heavily based on the location of events.68 Traditional choice of 
law principles favor applying the law of the place where the last act 
necessary to confer a claim on the plaintiff occurred.69 Modern 
choice of law principles favor applying the law of the jurisdiction 
with the most significant relationship to the litigation.70 As a conse-
quence, in the majority of transferred cases, transferee law will be 
preferable to transferor law based on choice of law considerations 
and thus is the appropriate per se position to adopt if the system 
prefers a per se to an ad hoc rule.11 
Because the arguments in support of a plaintiff's choice of law 
privilege are weak, other factors supporting the result in Van Dusen 
assume increased prominence. Van Dusen may be justified on the 
basis of efficiency concerns similar to those that underlie the plain-
tiff's venue privilege. To prevent expenditure of systemic resources 
through reconsideration of venue in a large number of cases, the 
plaintiff's venue choice is entitled to substantial respect. The Van 
Dusen Court noted that applying transferee law would give the de-
fendant. an incentive to engage in gamesmanship and forum shop-
ping and to make transfer motions for reasons unrelated to the core 
values underlying section 1404(a): efficiency and convenience.72 In 
part to prevent forum shopping by defendants, the Court rejected 
67. But see Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 637 n.36 (1964) (rejecting this argument 
to prevent transfer decisions from having outcome-detenninative effects). 
68. See supra text accompanying notes 31-32 . 
. 69. See infra text accompanying notes 197-200. 
70. See infra text accompanying note 201. 
71. See Marcus, supra note 17, at 698 ("[A]ny connection between the convenience of the 
forum and the choice of law would point to preferring the law of the transferee [forum]."). 
72. Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 636 (1964). 
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"the rather startling conclusion that one might 'get a change of law 
as a bonus for a change of venue.' "73 
The marginal efficiency benefit of the Van Dusen rule is unclear. 
The plaintiff's venue privilege already contains a substantial disin-
centive to filing ill-founded transfer motions. A transfer motion 
will not be granted unless there is a large inequity in the balance of 
convenience. This rule should discourage most groundless transfer 
motions. 14 On the other hand, courts make transfer decisions ac-
cording to an inherently uncertain multifactor balancing test.75 As 
a consequence, the defendant will usually have colorable grounds to 
argue in favor of a transfer if presented with the prospect of a 
favorable change in law.76 Thus; Van Dusen increases to some ex-
tent the marginal efficiency of the venue system. 
Federalism concerns provide the strongest support for the Van 
Dusen holding. The Court noted that its holding was "supported by 
the policy underlying Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins. "71 Erie rested in 
large part on respect for state sovereignty78 and a concern that the 
existence of federal diversity jurisdiction should not change the re-
sults in state law cases.79 Were transferee state law to apply, the 
73. 376 U.S. at 636 (quoting Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514, 522 (1953) 
(Jackson, J., dissenting)). 
74. See Comment, Choice of Law After Transfer of Venue, 15 YALE L.J. 90, 97 (1965) 
(arguing that defendants have little ability to forum shop because "there [is] rarely ... more 
than one most convenient forum, and it [is] dictated by objective factors over which the 
defendant has no control"). 
75. See supra text accompanying notes 31-32. 
76. See Kelner, supra note 36, at 616 ("[L]ack of defined standards allows parties to util-
ize statutory transfer for purely strategic purposes, such as ..• manipulating the applicable 
law."). 
77. Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 637. For an interesting view on the relationship between Erie 
and Van Dusen, see Maltz, supra note 41. Professor Maltz argues that federal diversity juris-
diction and Erie are based on a " 'limited impact theory' - the principle that federal instru-
mentalities should have only a limited impact on the overall process of governing the nation." 
Id. at 239-40. He supports Van Dusen as a correct application of the limited impact theory 
· because "by holding that a transfer [on] defendant's motion will not change the applicable 
law, Van Dusen ensures that such a transfer will have no other effects." Id. at 257. 
78. Justice Brandeis suggested that federal courts lacked the constitutional power to pro-
mulgate federal common law in diversity cases. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-
80 (1938). 
79. See 304 U.S. at 74-75 (objecting to the creation of federal common law in diversity 
cases, which "introduced grave discrimination by non-citizens against citizens" and "rendered 
impossible equal protection of the law"); see also Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 
109 (1945) ("The nub of the policy that underlies Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins is that for the same 
transaction the accident of a suit by a non-resident litigant in a federal court instead of in a 
State court a block away should not lead to a substantially different result."). As a conse-
quence of the desire to achieve uniformity between federal and state courts in the same 
location, the Supreme Court has held that a large number of seemingly procedural matters 
are substantive for Erie purposes. See, e.g., Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 
541, 555-56 (1949) (holding that requirements for shareholder derivative litigation are sub-
stantive); Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535, 538 (1949) (holding that a door-
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existence of federal diversity jurisdiction would change the result 
that would have occurred in the courts of the transferor state be-
cause, assuming state courts in the transferor jurisdiction would not 
have dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds, so transfers be-
tween state courts are impossible.Bl Were transferee state law to 
apply in the federal system, plaintiffs would have an incentive to file 
in state court to attempt to insulate their cases against transfer and 
change of law.sz Defendants would have an incentive to remove 
cases to federal court in an attempt to procure transfer and change 
of law. Discouraging parties from choosing between federal and 
state courts in the same location in an attempt to obtain more 
favorable law is central to Erie. 83 Thus, the Van Dusen Court held 
that "[a] change of venue under§ 1404 (a) generally should be, with 
respect to state law, but a change of courtrooms."84 
Because the Van Dusen Court's Erie analysis is the most satisfy-
ing ground for its decision, there is a temptation to dismiss the 
other grounds. The grounds predicated upon the plaintiff's venue 
and choice of law privileges, however, provide independent support 
for the result in Van Dusen and appear to have primacy over the 
Erie ground. The Court discussed Erie only at the conclusion of its 
analysis of the effect of venue change on choice of law,ss after it had 
already decided that the plaintiff's venue and choice of law privi-
leges required the application of transferor law.s6 The Van Dusen 
Court noted that Erie applied only by analogy because Van Dusen 
itself dealt with "a congressional statute apportioning the business 
closing statute is substantive); Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 
532-34 {1949) {holding that the tolling of a statute of limitations is substantive); Guaranty 
Trust, 326 U.S. at 108-10 (holding that the length of a limitations period is substantive); 
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941) {holding that choice of law 
rules are substantive). 
80. Van Dusen reserved decision in cases in which the state where the transferor district 
court is located would have dismissed the case on forum non conveniens grounds. See 316 
U.S. at 640. 
81. As a consequence, Van Dusen held that "the critical identity to be maintained is be-
tween the federal district court which decides the case and the courts of the State in which 
the action was filed." 376 U.S. at 639. 
82. Presumably the plaintiff would also attempt to defeat diversity and prevent removal 
by joining marginal nondiverse parties as defendants. Although fraudulent joinder to destroy 
diversity will be disregarded by the federal courts, see, e.g., Poulos v. Naas Foods, Inc., 959 
F.2d 69, 72-74 {7th Cir. 1992), eliminating incentives for this kind of gamesmanship was a 
core Erie concern. See infra note 83 and accompanying text. 
83. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 73-74 (1938) (noting the widespread criticism 
of permitting reincorporation for the purpose of creating diversity jurisdiction and gaining 
access to federal court and federal common law). 
84. 376 U.S. at 639. 
85. See 376 U.S. at 637-39. 
86. See 376 U.S. at 626-37. 
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of the federal courts."87 The Van Dusen Court appears to have con-
ceived of its mission more as an exercise in interpreting section 
1404(a) than in applying Erie. 
2. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno 
The Supreme Court's decision in Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reynoss 
may appear to have undercut the existence of a plaintiff's venue 
and choice of law privileges. Upon closer analysis, however, Piper 
does little to contradict Gulf Oil or Van Dusen. In Piper, the legal 
representative of the estates of five Scottish passengers who died in 
the crash of a small commercial aircraft in Scotland brought suit in 
a California state court against the manufacturers of the propeller 
and the plane - both American corporations.89 The plaintiff ad-
mitted that she chose an American forum to take advantage of do-
mestic law regarding liability, capacity to sue, and damages.9o The 
defendants removed the action and had it transferred to the United 
States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. After 
transfer, the defendants, presumably motivated at least in part by 
the desire to obtain better law, moved to dismiss on forum non con-
veniens grounds so that the case might be tried in Scotland.91 
In affirming the district court's decision to dismiss,92 the 
Supreme Court noted that "[t]he possibility of a change in substan-
tive law should ordinarily not be given conclusive or even substan-
tial weight in the forum non conveniens inquiry."93 The Court 
relied on systemic factors in arriving at this conclusion. Because 
"Li]urisdiction and venue requirements are often easily satisfied," a 
wide choice of fora is usually available to the plaintiff.94 Presuma-
bly, the plaintiff will bring the action in the forum that will apply 
the most favorable legal rules. Were an unfavorable change in law 
from the plaintiff's perspective to preclude application of the forum 
non conveniens doctrine, the doctrine would seldom apply, even 
87. 376 U.S. at 637. 
88. 454 U.S. 235 (1981). 
89. See 454 U.S. at 238-40. Gaynell Reyno, the plaintiff, was a legal secretary to the 
attorney that filed the suit She was appointed by a California court to represent the estates 
of the deceased passengers. 454 U.S. at 239. 
90. See 454 U.S. at 240. Scottish law does not recognize strict liability in tort, permits 
only relatives to bring wrongful death actions, and limits recovery in wrongful death actions 
to compensation for loss of support and society. 454 U.S. at 240. 
91. See 454 U.S. at 240-42. 
92. See 454 U.S. at 247-61. 
93. 454 U.S. at 247. 
94. 454 U.S. at 250. 
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when the Gulf Oil factors pointed heavily in favor of an alternative 
forum.9s 
Piper went to some pains to distinguish rather than contradict 
Van Dusen. Piper emphasized that Van Dusen involved an intrasys-
tem transfer rather than a forum non conveniens dismissal.96 As a 
consequence, the Van Dusen Court had available a mechanism that 
the Piper Court did not: the ability to protect the plaintiff's choice 
of law privilege and allow venue decisions to proceed uninhibited 
by potential changes in the law.97 In the forum non conveniens 
context, the only way to protect the plaintiff's choice of law privi-
lege is to deny dismissal, which in some cases requires the trial to 
proceed in an inconvenient forum. Thus, Piper may be viewed as 
confined to the forum non conveniens context and may not disturb 
any choice of law privilege that Van Dusen recognized in the trans-
fer context. 
Moreover, despite some harsh and categorical language,98 Piper 
lends support to the existence of a plaintiff's choice of law privilege 
even in the forum non conveniens context. The Court noted that 
"if the remedy provided by the alternative forum is so clearly inade-
quate or unsatisfactory that it is no remedy at all, the unfavorable 
change in law may be given substantial weight; the district court 
may conclude that dismissal would not be in the interests of jus-
tice."99 The Court gave as an example the case in which "the alter-
native forum does not permit litigation of the subject matter of the 
dispute."10° Thus, the Piper Court agreed with Van Dusen that 
change of venue should not be the functional equivalent of dismis-
sal on the merits. Unless the plaintiff's original choice of forum 
creates ~ vested right to the law this forum would have applied, it is 
hard to understand why elimination of the plaintiff's claims through 
change of venue causes any unfairness. 
The Piper Court was also careful to limit its holding to the spe-
cific facts before it. The Court noted that an unfavorable change in 
the law should not preclude a forum non conveniens dismissal "[a]t 
95. See 454 U.S. at 247-51. The Court also relied on the desire to avoid burdening the 
forum non conveniens inquiry with difficult choice of law questions. See 454 U.S. at 251; see 
also supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text (discussing Gulf Oil factors). 
96. See 454 U.S. at 253. 
97. See 454 U.S. at 253 n.20 (noting that Van Dusen cited decisions that "frequently 
rested on the assumption that a change in law would have been unavoidable under common 
law forum non conveniens, but could be avoided under § 1404(a)"). 
98. See supra text accompanying note 93. 
99. 454 U.S. at 254. 
100. 454 U.S. at 254 n.22. 
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least where· [a] foreign plaintiff named an American manufacturer 
as defendant."101 A contrary result would make American fora in-
ordinately attractive to foreign plaintiffs and increase the conges-
tion of the American court system.102 The Court further 
acknowledged that under Gulf Oil "a plaintiff's choice of forum 
should rarely be disturbed."103 It believed, however, that the pre-
sumption in favor of the plaintiff's choice of forum "applies with 
less force when the plaintiff or real parties in interest are for-
eign."104 As a consequence, Piper holds only that an unfavorable 
change in law should not be a significant forum non conveniens fac-
tor when the plaintiff is foreign.1os It does not necessarily undercut 
an American plaintiff's venue and choice of law privileges. 
3. Ferens v. John Deere Co. 
In Ferens v. John Deere Co.,106 the Supreme Court returned to 
an issue that it had reserved in Van D'USen101 and held that trans-
feror state law applies in diversity cases even when the plaintiff re-
quests the transfer .10s In so doing, the Court confirmed the 
existence of a plaintiff's venue and choice of law privileges in 
strong terms. The Ferens Court viewed Van D'USen as resting on 
three independent considerations: 
First, § 1404(a) should not deprive parties of state-law advantages 
that exist absent diversity jurisdiction. Second,§ 1404(a) should not 
create or multiply opportunities for forum shopping. Third, the deci-
sion to transfer venue under§ 1404(a) should turn on considerations 
of convenience and the interest of justice rather than on the possible 
prejudice resulting from a change of law.109 
The Court held that these considerations require the application of 
transferor state law without regard to which party requested the 
transfer .110 
With regard to the first Van D'USen factor, the Ferens Court be-
lieved that the plaintiff has a venue privilege that includes a choice 
101. 454 U.S. at 251. 
102. 454 U.S. at 252. 
103. 454 U.S. at 241. 
104. 454 U.S. at 255. 
105. See McAllen, supra note 32, at 238 n.231 (arguing that Piper discusses "the question 
of deference to the plaintiff's choice of forum, but only in the context of explaining why there 
should be less deference when the plaintiff is a foreigner"). 
106. 494 U.S. 516 (1990). 
107. See Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 640 (1964). 
108. See 494 U.S. at 519. 
109. 494 U.S. at 523. 
110. See 494 U.S. at 523. 
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of law privilege,111 and that it would be wrong to eliminate the 
plaintiff's choice of law advantage even when the plaintiff requests 
the transfer.112 This vision constitutes an extreme view of the plain-
tiff's choice of law privilege, because if the plaintiff requests the 
transfer, the transferee forum might fairly be viewed as the plain-
tiff's chosen venue.113 The plaintiff is allowed to control both 
venue and choice of law even after, at the plaintiff's request, the 
two cease to be linked.114 
The Ferens Court viewed the second Van Dusen factor - dis-
couraging forum shopping by defendants - as largely inapplicable 
to plaintiff-initiated transfers.115 Plaintiff forum shopping did not 
trouble the Court because, in the Court's view, the venue and 
choice of law privileges give the plaintiff the right to forum shop.116 
The Court's rule, however, encourages strategic conduct by plain-
tiffs. After Ferens, plaintiffs are well advised to file in fora that pro-
vide the best plaintiffs' law without regard to convenience and then 
seek a transfer to a more convenient venue when necessary.117 The 
Court failed to explain why the plaintiff should be allowed to en-
gage in double forum shopping - once to pick the law and once to 
pick the venue - or why the system should tolerate the inefficien-
cies attendant to such conduct.us Such a result might fairly be 
viewed as multiplying the opportunities for forum shopping, a result 
at odds even with Ferens's view of Van Dusen.119 
Applying the third Van Dusen factor, the Ferens Court believed 
that application of transferor law is desirable to divorce transfer 
111. See 494 U.S at 524 (citing "[t]he policy that § 1404(a) should not deprive parties of 
state-law advantages"). 
112. See 494 U.S. at 524-27. 
113. See 494 U.S. at 535 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
114. See 494 U.S. at 537 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the plaintiff should not be 
allowed "to have his cake and eat it too - to litigate in the more convenient forum that he 
desires, but with the law of the distant forum that he desires"). 
115. See 494 U.S. at 527-28. 
116. See 494 U.S. at 527 ("[E]ven without § 1404(a), a plaintiff already has the option of 
shopping for a forum with the most favorable law."). For a reversal of the usual view and an 
argument that courts should worry less about defendant forum shopping, see Stein, supra 
note 29, at 826 n.199 ("The 'evil' of forum shopping is not that it is motivated by a desire to 
manipulate the applicable law. Rather, it is that there is a disproportionate advantage be-
stowed on the plaintiff ••.• "). 
117. See 494 U.S. at 538 {Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the "file-and-transfer ploy" 
sanctioned by the Ferens majority). 
118. Cf. Ursula Marie Henninger, Note,, The Plaintiff's Forum Shopping Gold Card: 
Choice of Law in Federal Courts After Transfer of Venue Under Section 1404(a) - Ferens v. 
John Deere Co., 26 WAKE FoREST L. REv. 809, 826-27 (1991) (arguing that plaintiffs should 
not be able to shop for the most favorable law and the most convenient court). 
119. See supra text accompanying note 109. 
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considerations from choice of law.120 The Court asserted that "Van 
Dusen also made clear that the decision to transfer venue under 
§ 1404(a) should turn on considerations of convenience rather than 
on the possibility of prejudice resulting from a change in the appli-
cable law."121 It is hard to understand, however, how the plaintiff 
can ever be prejudiced by a change in law pursuant to a transfer the 
plaintiff requests or why the court should take such prejudice into 
account.122 The Court's real concern in this area seems to be that a 
contrary rule might burden the system with trials in inconvenient 
fora - imposing unnecessary burdens on witnesses, jurors, and the 
court123 - and violate the principle that" '[t]here is a local interest 
in having localized controversies decided at home.' "124 Were trans-
feree law to apply, plaintiffs would have an incentive to file in in-
convenient fora that provided the best law and decline to request 
transfer.125 Although the defendant might request a transfer,126 or 
the court might order one sua sponte,127 the other actors in the pro-
cess might decline to seek transfer to force the plaintiff to live with 
the consequences of the filing decision. In these cases, the judicial 
system would be burdened with trying cases in inconvenient fora.128 
However, the cases in which both the defendant and the court 
would concur in allowing the trial to proceed in an inconvenient 
forum would seem to be minimal. 
Noticeably absent from the Court's list of Van Dusen factors iS 
any reference to Erie. ·The Ferens Court viewed Erie as providing 
support for the first Van Dusen factor - that transfer should not 
deprive the plaintiff of vested state law advantages129 - but did not 
120. See 494 U.S. at 528-29; see also supra text accompanying note 59 (explaining how the 
concern about divorcing choice of law and transfer decisions presumes a plaintiff's choice of 
law privilege). 
121. 494 U.S. at 528. 
122. See 494 U.S. at 536 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that "the principle of volenti non 
fit injuria suffices to allay" any concern that the plaintiff is prejudiced). 
123. See 494 U.S. at 529. 
124. 494 U.S. at 530 (quoting Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 509 (1947)). 
125. See 494 U.S. at 529. 
126. See John D. CUrrivan, Note, Choice of Law in Federal Court After Transfer of Venue, 
63 CoRNELL L. REv. 149, 156 (1977) (concluding that a plaintiff who files in an inconvenient 
forum can usually count on the defendant to make a transfer motion). 
127. See 494 U.S. at 537 (Scalia, J., dissenting); I-T-E Circuit Breaker Co. v. Becker, 343 
F.2d 361, 363 (8th Cir. 1965) (noting that the district court has the power to effect§ 1404(a) 
transfers sua sponte); Kirby v. Mercury Sav. & Loan Assn., 755 F. Supp. 445, 448 (D.D.C. 
1990) (same). 
128. See 494 U.S. at 530 ("The desire to take a punitive view of the plaintiff's actions 
should not obscure the systemic costs of litigating in an inconvenient place."). 
129. See 494 U.S. at 524. 
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view Erie policies as independently significant. Moreover, the re-
sult in Ferens seems squarely at odds with Erie, as Justice Scalia 
argued in a vigorous dissent joined by three other Justices. The Fer-
ens rule allows plaintiffs to use the federal courts to obtain advan-
tages they could not obtain in state court.130 In selecting state fora, 
plaintiffs must choose between venue and choice of law advantages 
when these advantages reside in different states.131 Ferens allows 
the plaintiff simultaneously to reap both sets of advantages. As a 
consequence, the existence of federal diversity jurisdiction has the 
potential to change outcomes in cases governed by state law and 
gives the plaintiff an incentive to file in federal rather than state 
court in a given location.132 Preventing this kind of forum shopping 
was a central concern of Erie.133 
C. Conclusion 
In Gulf Oil and Van Dusen, the Supreme Court implied that the 
plaintiff has venue and choice of law privileges that should not be 
disturbed by transfer. These privileges survived Piper ·and were 
strengthened by Ferens. The Ferens Court's relegation of Erie prin-
ciples to secondary status demonstrates that it is incorrect to view 
Van Dusen as based purely on' Erie concerns. As a consequence, 
the plaintiff's venue and choice of law privileges, as well as the 
other Van Dusen factors emphasized by the Ferens Court, must be 
taken seriously in the federal issue context. 
II. THE HISTORY OF FEDERAL QUESTION TRANSFERS 
When courts have permanently transferred cases containing fed-
eral issues within the federal system, they have uniformly applied 
transferee federal law. In this context, the courts have relied on the 
theoretical uniformity of federal law and taken the view that Van 
Dusen is inapplicable. By contrast, after MDL transfers, the federal 
courts initially applied transferor federal law based on Van Dusen, 
with little explanation. In re Korean Air Lines Disa~ter of Septem-
130. See 494 U.S. at 533-36 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Maltz, supra note 41, at 257 (arguing 
that Ferens is inconsistent with Erie because it gives "the plaintiff an option that he would not 
have had in the absence of federal diversity jurisdiction"); Henninger, supra note 118, at 826 
(accusing the Ferens majority of "apparently forg[etting] the policies which supported the 
Erie decision"). 
131. See 494 U.S. at 536 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
132. See 494 U.S. at 536 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that "[t]he significant federal 
judicial policy" in favor of uniformity between federal and state courts in the same location 
"is reduced to a laughingstock if it can so readily be evaded through filing-and-transfer"). 
133. See supra text accompanying notes 77-83. 
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ber 1, 1983134 held that transferee federal law also applies after an 
MDL transfer.13s Since that decision, a consensus has developed 
that transferee federal law applies after both permanent and MDL 
transfers. This Part examines the history of federal question 
transfers. 
A. The Early Cases 
1. Permanent Transfers 
The first significant case to consider the effect of permanent 
transfer on choice of federal law was Clayton v. Warlick.136 In this 
case, the plaintiff brought a federal patent infringement action in 
the United States District Court for the Western District of North 
Carolina. The defendant moved to transfer to the Northern District 
of Illinois. The plaintiff candidly admitted that he chose to proceed 
in North Carolina because the Fourth Circuit's law on an important 
patent issue was more favorable to him than the Seventh Cir-
cuit's.131 The district court granted the transfer motion,138 and the 
Fourth Circuit held that mandamus was not available to review the 
district court's decision.139 
The court also noted on the merits of the mandamus question 
that the district court had not abused its discretion in transferring 
the case.140 The Fourth Circuit assumed that the Northern District 
of Illinois would apply Seventh Circuit law to the case and believed 
that tli.is result presented no impediment to transfer. The court 
viewed federal law as theoretically uniform and, therefore, believed 
that any difference between the views of the Fourth and Seventh 
Circuits was irrelevant to the tr~sfer decision: 
[T]he same law, the federal patent law, will be applied wherever [the 
case] is tried. We are not impressed by the argument that such trans-
fer should be denied because of an alleged conflict of decision be-
tween this Circuit and the Seventh on an important question of law 
involved in the case. If there be such conflict, this presents a matter 
for consideration by the Supreme Court on application for certiorari, 
not for consideration by a district judge on application for transfer 
134. 829 F.2d 1171 (D.C. Cir. 1987), affd. sub nom. Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 
U.S. 122 (1989). 
135. 829 F.2d at 1176. 
136. 232 F.2d 699 (4th Cir. 1956). 
137. 232 F.2d at 700-01. 
138. Clayton v. Swift & Co., 137 F. Supp. 219 (W.D.N.C. 1956), mandamus denied, 232 
F.2d 699. 
139. See 232 F.2d at 706. 
140. 232 F.2d at 706. 
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under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). We have no sympathy with shopping 
around for forums .... "[T]he courts of one District or Circuit must be 
presumed to be as able and as well qualified to handle litigation as 
those in another."141 
The Second Circuit's decision in H.L. Green Co. v. Mac-
Mahon142 followed the result and reasoning of Clayton.143 In 
Green, the Second Circuit refused to grant a writ of mandamus 
against a district judge who had transferred a federal securities ac-
tion from a federal court in New York to one in Alabama.144 The 
court squarely rejected the argument that a detrimental change in 
law from the plaintiff's perspective was a factor to consider in con-
nection with a transfer motion. Like the Fourth Circuit, the Second 
Circuit relied on the theoretical uniformity of federal law: 
A plaintiff may not resist the transfer of his action to another district 
court on the ground that the transferee court will or may interpret 
federal law in a manner less favorable to him .... The federal courts 
comprise a single system applying a single body of law, and no litigant 
has a right to have the interpretation of one federal court rather than 
that of another determine his case.145 
Neither Clayton nor Green dealt squarely with the choice of law 
question. Both courts assumed that transferee federal law would 
apply and held that a detrimental change in law from the plaintiff's 
perspective was not a factor in the transfer calculus.146 In this re-
gard, Clayton and Green prefigured Piper rather than Van Dusen.147 
They divorced choice of law from the efficiency considerations that 
should otherwise govern transfer decisions by holding that a change 
in the law was not a relevant transfer factor. It presumably fell to 
141. 232 F.2d at 706 (quoting Carbide & Carbon Chems. Corp. v. United States Indus. 
Chems., Inc., 140 F.2d 47, 49 (4th Cir. 1944)). 
142. 312 F.2d 650 {2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 928 (1963). 
143. The Second Circuit's seminal decision in Green was prefigured in the lesser-known 
case of Ackert v. van Pelt Bryan, 299 F.2d 65 {2d Cir. 1962), in which the court, over a strong 
dissent by Judge Friendly, see 299 F.2d at 71-72, allowed the permanent transfer of a case to a 
circuit that would probably dismiss the plaintiff's federal claim. The court assumed that the 
transferee court would apply the law of its own circuit after the transfer. See 299 F.2d at 69. 
To the contrary is Ruskay v. Reed, 225 F. Supp. 581 {S.D.N.Y. 1963), in which the district 
court exercised its discretion in refusing to transfer a case to a circuit that would not recog-
nize the plaintiff's claim. See 225 F. Supp. at 583. 
144. See 312 F.2d at 654. 
145. 312 F.2d at 652. 
146. One court has interpreted a plaintiff's desire to avoid the less favorable law of an-
other circuit as a factor affirmatively supporting the defendant's transfer motion. See 
Cheeseman v. Carey, 485 F. Supp. 203, 215 (S.D.N.Y.), affd. on other grounds, 623 F.2d 1387 
(2d Cir. 1980); see also Ziegler v. Dart Indus., Inc., 383 F. Supp. 362, 364-65 (D. Del. 1974} 
(assuming that transferee federal law applies after a permanent transfer and denying the 
plaintiff's motion for transfer to a circuit with more favorable law). 
147. See supra text accompanying notes 55-57, 93-95. 
February 1995] The Appellate Model 725 
the transferee courts themselves to determine which circuit's law to 
apply in these cases.148 In later cases that postdate Van Dusen, 
transferee courts applied the federal law of their own circuits in ac-
cordance with Clayton and Green; they argued, with little analysis, 
that Van Dusen was limited to the state law context and that the 
theoretical uniformity of federal law required the application of 
transferee circuit precedent.149 
Clayton, Green, and their progeny rest on a questionable prem-
ise. While Clayton and Green insist that federal law is theoretically 
uniform, both cases demonstrate that federal law is not uniform in 
practice and that this lack of practical uniformity has significant 
consequences for the parties. The plaintiffs in Clayton and Green 
148. See Club Assistance Program, Inc. v. Zukerman, 598 F. Supp. 734, 738 (N.D. Ill. 
1984) (leaving the choice of which circuit's law to apply in federal question cases to the 
transferee court); see also Air Express Intl. Corp. v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc., 586 F. 
Supp. 889, 893 (D. Conn. 1984). 
149. See, e.g., In re Pittsburgh & L.E.R.R. Co. Sec. & Antitrust Litig., 543 F.2d 1058, 1065 
n.19 (3d Cir. 1976); Satellite Fm. Planning Corp. v. First Natl. Bank, 633 F. Supp. 386, 393-94 
(D. Del.1986); Roth v. Bank of the Commonwealth, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L 
Rep. (CCH) i 98;2.67, at 91,712 & n.13 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 1981}; see also Henry J. Friendly, 
The "Law of the Circuit" and All That, 46 ST. JoHN's L REv. 406, 412 (1972} (viewing Van 
Dusen as "limited to choices of state law"). After Van Dusen, potential transferor courts 
continued to assume, as Clayton and Green had, that transferee federal law would apply after 
a transfer. See Ziegler, 383 F. Supp. at 364-65; Scheinbart v. Certain-Teed Prods. Corp., 367 
F. Supp. 707, 710-11 (S.D.N.Y.1973); cf. United States v. Barrientos, 485 F. Supp. 789, 791-93 
(E.D. Pa. 1980} (suggesting that transferee federal law applies after the transfer of a criminal 
case). But see Oldfield v. Alston, 77 F.R.D. 735, 743 & n.2 (N.D. Ga. 1978) (applying trans-
feror federal law after a permanent transfer). 
The American Law Institute (ALI), in the context of recommending the application of 
transferee federal law after the permanent consolidation of mass tort cases, see infra text 
accompanying notes 285-87, has recently suggested that there is a split of authority on the 
federal law applicable to a permanently transferred case. See ALI, CoMPLEX LmGATION 
PRoracr § 6.08 cmt. b, note 4 (Proposed Final Draft, Apr. 5, 1993) [hereinafter CLP]. How-
ever, all the permanent transfer cases cited by the ALI to demonstrate sµch a split are cases 
in which federal statutes incorporated state limitations periods and the transferee court ap-
plied the same limitations period that the transferor court would have applied. See Sargent v. 
Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d 750, 758 (5th Cir. 1974); Thom v. New York City Dept. of Social 
Servs., 523 F. Supp. 1193, 1197-98 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Campbell v. Upjohn Co., 498 F. Supp. 
722, 726 (W.D. Mich. 1980), affd., 676 F.2d 1122 (6th Cir. 1982); Brick v. Dominion Mortgage 
& Realty Trust, 442 F. Supp. 283, 299 (W.D.N.Y. 1977); Corey v. Bache & Co., 355 F. Supp. 
1123, 1125 (S.D. W. Va. 1973}; see also Berry Petroleum Co. v. Adams & Peck, 518 F.2d 402, 
406 (2d Cir. 1975) (§ 1407 transfer); Railing v. United Mine Workers, 429 F.2d 780, 781 (4th 
Cir.1970), revg. 276 F. Supp. 238, 241 (N.D. W. Va. 1967) (§ 1404(a) transfer}, vacated, 401 
U.S. 486 (1971); In re Clinton Oil Co. Sec. Litig., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. 
Rep. (CCH) 'I 96,015, at 91,566-67 (D. Kan. Mar. 18, 1977) (§ 1407 transfer). At the time 
they were decided, these cases involved a straightforward application of Van Dusen to state 
law issues. As a result, they cannot properly stand for the proposition that transferor federal 
law applies after a permanent transfer. See infra note 191 (describing the modem view). 
Thus, in Green, one of the landmark cases supporting the application of transferee federal 
law, the Second Circuit assumed that transferor state law would govern the limitations period 
applicable to a federal securities claim just as transferor law would govern any other state 
issue. See 312 F.2d at 652-53. The ALi's suggestion that there is a conflict on the federal law 
applicable to permanently transferred cases is simply.incorrect. 
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chose the initial fora, and the defendants moved to transfer, in large 
part due to the differences in federal law across the country. More-
over, the refusal of the more recent cases to give substantial consid-
eration to the application of Van Dusen in the federal issue context 
is cause for concern. Nevertheless, as Part III demonstrates, Clay-
ton and Green reached the correct result for the correct reason. 
2. MDL Transfers 
The MDL Act allows the JPML to consolidate cases involving 
common questions of fact for pretrial purposes.150 The first MDL 
court to consider the impact of transfer on choice of federal law was 
Philadelphia Housing Authority v. American Radiator & Standard 
Sanitary Corp.151 This case involved civil antitrust actions that had 
been commenced in the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia and transferred to the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania. The defendants moved to dismiss for lack of venue. In 
deciding this motion, the MDL court applied the law of the D.C. 
Circuit.152 The court cited Van Dusen without discussion and pro-
vided no justification for its choice of transferor federal law. The 
result may have seemed obvious to the court because both parties 
agreed that the Van Dusen rule applied.153 
This result, however, is far from obvious. There are at least two 
factors that potentially distinguish Van Dusen from Philadelphia 
Housing Authority: Van Dusen involved state law issues and a per-
manent transfer pursuant to section 1404(a), and Philadelphia 
Housing Authority involved federal issues and a pretrial transfer 
pursuant to section 1407. The court in Philadelphia Housing Au-
thority made no attempt to determine what difference, if any, these 
potential distinguishing factors made. It did not consider whether 
the line of authority established by Clayton and Green, which sup-
ported the application of transferee federal law in the permanent 
transfer context, applied in the MDL context and survived Van Du-
sen. Nevertheless, in In re Plumbing Fixtures Litigation,154 the 
JPML agreed with Philadelphia Housing Authority and asserted, 
without analysis, that transferor federal law applies after section 
1407 transfers.155 Prior to In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sep-
150. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1988). 
151. 309 F. Supp. 1053 (E.D. Pa. 1969). 
152. See 309 F. Supp. at 1054-55. 
153. See 309 F. Supp. at 1055. 
154. 342 F. Supp. 756 (J.P.M.L 1972). 
155. See 342 F. Supp. at 758. 
February 1995] The Appellate Model 727 
tember 1, 1983,156 these cases were uniformly followed with little 
discussion or analysis.157 
B. The Marcus Article 
A 1984 law review article by Professor Richard Marcus repre-
sents the first in-depth examination of the effect of transfer on the 
law applicable to federal issues.158 Marcus took the view that trans-
feree federal law should apply in all circumstances, without regard 
to whether the transfer was permanent or for pretrial purposes pur-
suant to the MDL Act.159 He based this conclusion on the funda-
mental differences between diversity and federal question cases. 
Marcus argued that Van Dusen principally protects two Erie poli-
cies in the diversity context: achieving uniformity of result between 
federal and state courts in the same location and preserving the in-
tegrity of state law.160 These policies are irrelevant in the federal 
question context.161 
Marcus acknowledged that Van Dusen also proceeds on a venue 
privilege theory that is potentially applicable to federal issues.162 
Relying on Piper, he discounted the general existence of this privi-
lege and argued that it applied only in diversity cases.163 In Mar-
cus's view, a plaintiff in a diversity case receives a choice of law 
privilege as a corollary to a venue privilege as a matter of necessity. 
Although Congress has the power to adopt choice of law rules in 
diversity cases, it has chosen not to. Moreover, although many have 
argued that the federal courts should fashion common law rules to 
156. 829 F.2d 1171 (D.C. Cir. 1987), affd. sub nom. Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 
U.S. 122 (1989). 
157. See, e.g., Berry Petroleum Co. v. Adams & Peck, 518 F.2d 402, 408 n.7 (2d Cir. 1975); 
In re Dow Co. "Sarabond" Prods. Liab. Litig., 666 F. Supp. 1466, 1468-70 (D. Colo. 1987); 
Sentner v. Amtrak, 540 F. Supp. 557, 559 n.5 (D.NJ. 1982); In re Haven Indus. Inc. Sec. 
Litig., 462 F. Supp. 172, 179 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); In re Clinton Oil Co. Sec. Litig., [1977-1978 
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 'I 96,015, at 91,568 (D. Kan. Mar. 18, 1977); In re 
Air Crash Disaster at Boston, Mass., 399 F. Supp. 1106, 1108 (D. Mass. 1975); Stirling v. 
Chemical Bank, 382 F. Supp. 1146, 1150 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), appeal dismissed, 511 F.2d 1030 
(2d Cir. 1975); In re Four Seasons· Sec. Laws Litig., 370 F. Supp. 219, 228 (W.D. Okla. 1974). 
158. See Marcus, supra note 17. 
159. See id. at 708-12 (discussing § 1404(a) transfers); id. at 716-19 (discussing § 1407 
transfers). 
160. See id. at 693-96. 
161. Id. at 696. 
162. See id. at 696-97. 
163. See id. at 698-700; see also Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case 
Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 38-39 n.220 (1989) (arguing that the con-
cept of a plaintiff's choice of law privilege "was shattered" in Piper). 
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determine the applicable state law in diversity cases,164 the 
Supreme Court held in Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufactur-
ing Co., 16s and reaffirmed in Day & Zimmermann, In~. v. Cha/-
loner, 166 that in such cases a federal district court must apply the 
choice of law rules of the state in which the district court is lo-
cated.167 Because federal courts are incompetent to fashion in-
dependent choice of law rules in diversity cases, Marcus argued that 
they had no option but to allow venue to determine choice of state 
law by default.168 
Believing that Van Dusen had no application in the federal 
question context, Marcus searched for federal principles that would 
determine the effect of a transfer on choice of federal law. Marcus 
identified the principle of competence.169 Federal courts lack the 
power to determine the substantive rules that will govern diversity 
cases. By contrast, in the federal question context "the federal 
courts have not only the power but the duty to decide [cases] cor-
rectly. . . . If a federal court simply accepts the interpretation of 
another circuit without addressing the merits, it is not doing its 
job."110 Because Marcus believed that every federal court of ap-
peals has the duty, in the absence of controlling Supreme Court 
authority, to apply its best view of federal law, he argued that trans-
feree circuit law should apply after both permanent and MDL 
transfers.111 
Although Marcus's view has received nearly universal accept-
ance by the courts, certain aspects of his analysis deserve reconsid-
eration. As discussed in Part I, Van Dusen and its progeny are not 
based solely or primarily on Erie concems.112 Thus, Marcus's dis-
missal of Van Dusen as a state law case is questionable. Because 
Piper seems limited to cases involving foreign plaintiffs, Marcus's 
164. See, e.g., Currie, Change of Venue, supra note 3, at 459-64, 502-03 (arguing for the 
application of federal choice of law principles on state law questions in the transfer context 
and noting that this solution would probably undermine Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. 
Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941)); Seidelson, supra note 36, at 90-92 (arguing that federal choice of 
law principles, rather than Klaxon, should apply to pendent state claims); Comment, supra 
note 74, at 130-34 (supporting the application of federal interest analysis in choosing state 
law in the transfer context and the overruling of Klaxon). 
165. 313 U.S. 487 (1941). 
166. 423 U.S. 3 {1975). 
167. The Klaxon rule has been heavily criticized. See, e.g., Henninger, supra note 118, at 
818 n.86 {collecting authorities). 
168. See Marcus, supra note 17, at 700-01. 
169. See id. at 702-09. 
170. Id. at 702. 
171. See id. at 705-19. 
172. See generally supra section I.B. 
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use of Piper to undercut support for a plaintiff's choice of law privi-
lege is also questionable. Although I agree with Marcus that, in the 
absence of controlling authority, every court generally has the ca-
pacity and the duty to apply its best view of federal law, I do not 
believe that this principle requires the application of transferee fed-
eral law in all ca$es. As I argue below,173 choice of circuit law at the 
district court level is more a matter of hierarchy within the federal 
system than of competence. I agree with Marcus that transferee 
federal law should apply_ after permanent transfers because the 
transferee circuit will hear any appeal and, as Marcus argues, will 
and should apply its own precedents.174 I also believe that these 
concerns outweigh any contrary policy arguments advanced in Van 
Dusen and Ferens. 115 In the MDL context, however, any appeal 
after a trial will be to the transferor court of appeals. As a conse-
quence, I contest Marcus's conclusion that transferee federal law 
should apply after an MDL transfer.116 
C. Korean Air Lines 
The first case to consider in depth the effect of a transfer on 
applicable federal law was the D.C. Circuit's decision in In re Ko-
rean Air Lines Disaster of September 1, 1983.111 In this case, plain-
tiffs brought multiple lawsuits relating to a Korean Air Lines flight 
that was destroyed by a Soviet aircraft before it could complete its 
journey from New York to South Korea. These lawsuits were con-
solidated for pretrial purposes pursuant to the MDL Act in the 
United States District Court for the District of Columbia. A central 
issue in the case involved the application of the damage limitation 
provisions of an international treaty - the Warsaw Convention -
as modified by an accord among airlines known as the Montreal 
Agreement.178 The Montreal Agreement imposes a per-passenger 
damage limitation of $75,000, provided that this limitation appears 
on passenger tickets in ten-point type.179 The Korean Air Lines 
tickets in question contained the limitation in eight-point type.180 
173. See infra section m.B. 
174. See infra section m.c. 
175. See infra text accompanying notes 259-64. 
176. See infra section IV.A. 
177. 829 F.2d 1171 (D.C. Cir. 1987), a!fd. sub nom. Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 
U.S. 122 (1989). 
178. See Liability Limitations of Warsaw Convention and Hague Protocol: Order Ap-
proving Agreement, 31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966). 
179. See id. 
180. See 829 F.2d at 1172. 
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Certain of the MDL cases had been transferred from district 
courts in the Second Circuit, which had held that failure to follow 
the typeface conventions of the Montreal Agreement prevents air-
lines from relying on the damage limitation provisions.181 The 
MDL judge believed he was not bound by Second Circuit precedent 
in the cases transferred from that circuit and, because the D.C. Cir-
cuit ·had not yet considered the question, was free to make his own 
determination in all the MDL cases. The district court held that 
Korean Air Lines' use of eight-point type did not preclude applica-
tion of the damage limitation provisions of the Warsaw Convention 
and Montreal Agreement.182 The D.C. Circuit and the Supreme 
Court affirmed the lower court decision on the merits.183 
In addressing the choice of law question, the D.C. Circuit, in an 
opinion by then-Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg, agreed with Professor 
Marcus that Van Dusen rested principally on Erie concerns that 
were irrelevant in the federal question context.184 The court 
adopted Marcus's competence principle as affirmative support for 
its decision that transferee federal law should apply.1ss The court 
also believed that a contrary rule would unnecessarily complicate 
MDL cases because it would require the MDL judge to apply dif-
ferent federal law to cases that had been transferred from different 
circuits, and that the law of the case principle would insulate its 
substantive decision from reversal in the Second Circuit following 
remand and trial.186 
Korean Air Lines is questionable for all the reasons that Mar-
cus's theories, on which the court heavily relied, are questionable. 
In addition, as Part IV demonstrates,187 the court's reliance on the 
need to create efficient MDL procedures does not justify its appli-
cation of transferee federal law in the MDL context. Moreover, as 
181. See 829 F.2d at 1172; see also In re Air Crash Disaster at Warsaw, Pol., on Mar. 14, 
1980, 705 F.2d 85 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 845 (1983). 
182. See In re Korean Airlines Disaster of Sept 1, 1983, 664 F. Supp. 1463 (D.D.C. 1985), 
affd., 829 F.2d 1171 (D.C. Cir. 1987), affd. sub nom. Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 
122 (1989). 
183. See 829 F.2d at 1173 (adopting the district court's opinion), affd. sub nom. Chan v. 
Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122 (1989). The Supreme Court opinion did not consider 
the choice of law question. 
184. See 829 F.2d at 1174-75. 
185. See 829 F.2d at 1175 (relying on a passage from Marcus's article). 
186. See 829 F.2d at 1175-76; infra section IV.B.2 (explaining and applying the law of the 
case principle). 
187. See infra section IV.C.3. 
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Part IV also demonstrates,188 Judge Ginsburg's reliance on the law 
of the case principle is unsound. 
D. Conclusion 
In the aftermath of Korean Air Lines, a consensus is developing 
that transferee federal law applies after both permanent1s9 and 
MDV9D transfers. My research has disclosed no case decided after 
Korean Air Lines that takes a contrary view.191 Indeed, bowing to 
the new consensus, the JPML recently overruled its opinion in the 
188. See infra section IV.B.2. 
189. See Newton v. Thomason, 22 F.3d 1455, 1460 {9th Cir. 1994); Tel-Phonic Servs., Inc. 
v. TBS Intl., Inc., 975 F.2d 1134, 1138 {5th Cir. 1992); Novodzelsky v. Astor, Weiss & New-
man, No. CIV.A.94-2407, 1994 WL 527281, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Sept 22, 1994); In re College 
Bound Consol. Litig., No. 93 Civ. 2348(MBM),1994 WL236163, at *6 n.1 {S.D.N.Y. May 31, 
1994); Center Cadillac, Inc. v. Bank Leumi Trust Co., 808 F. Supp. 213, 222-24 (S.D.N.Y. 
1992); Wegbreit v. Marley Orchards Corp., 793 F. Supp. 965, 968-69 (E.D. Wash. 1992); TBG 
Inc. v. Bendis, [1991-1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) <{ 96,623, at 92,921-23 
(D. Kan. Mar. 5, 1992); In re Air Crash at Detroit Metro. Airport, Detroit, Mich. on Aug. 16, 
1987, 791 F. Supp. 1204, 1212-13 (E.D. Mich. 1992); Isaac v. Life Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 
749 F. Supp. 855, 863 (E.D. Tenn. 1990); Greyhound Fin. Corp. v. Willyard, No. 87-C-0911B, 
1989 WL 201094, at *13-*14. (D. Utah Dec. 26, 1989); cf. In re Pan Am. Corp., 950 F.2d 839, 
847-48 {2d Cir. 1991) (applying Korean Air Lines after a transfer pursuant to the Bankruptcy 
Act); Fossett Corp. v. Gearhart, 694 F. Supp. 1325, 1328 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (granting a transfer 
and dismissing the idea that a transferee court must apply transferor law). 
190. See Menowitz v. Brown, 991 F.2d 36, 39-41 (2d Cir.1993); In re TMJ Implants Prods. 
Liab. Litig., No. 94-MD-1001, 1995WL16766, at *4 (D. Minn. Jan. 17, 1995); In re Air Disas-
ter, 819 F. Supp. 1352, 1369-71 (E.D. Mich. 1993); In re Integrated Resources Real Estate 
Ltd. Partnerships Sec. Litig., 815 F. Supp. 620, 635-37 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); In re Taxable Mun. 
Bond Sec. Litig., 796 F. Supp. 954, 962-63 (E.D. La. 1992); In re Donald J. Trump Casino Sec. 
Litig., 793 F. Supp. 543, 547-48 (D.NJ. 1992), affd., 7 F.3d 357, 368 n.8 (3d Cir. 1993) ( declin-
ing to review the choice of law question because neither party challenged it on appeal), cert. 
denied, 114 S. Ct 1219 {1994); In re Air Crash Disaster at Stapleton Intl. Airport, 720 F. 
Supp. 1493, 1496 (D. Colo. 1989). 
191. Potentially inconsistent with Korean Air Lines are cases in which federal statutes 
incorporated state limitations periods and the transferee court applied the same limitations 
period that the transferor court would have applied. See Eckstein v. Balcor Film Investors, 8 
F.3d 1121, 1126-27 (7th Cir. 1993) (§ 1404(a) transfer), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct 883 {1994); In 
re United Mine Workers, 854 F. Supp. 914, 916-22 (D.D.C. 1994) (§ 1407 transfer); In re 
Rospatch Sec. Litig., 760 F. Supp. 1239, 1256-58 (W.D. Mich. 1991) (§ 1404(a) transfer). 
Prior to 1983, this result was thought to involve a straightforward application of Van Dusen 
on state law issues. See supra note 149. It is now settled that the limitations question is 
federal in nature. See DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 159 n.13 
(1983) ("[T]he choice of a limitations period for a federal cause of action is itself a question 
of federal law."). As a consequence, most recent cases have applied transferee law in accord-
ance with Korean Air Lines after both pretrial, see Menowitz, 991 F.2d at 39-41; Integrated 
Resources, 815 F. Supp. at 635-37; Taxable Mun. Bond, 796 F. Supp. at 962-63; cf. In re Litig. 
Involving Alleged Loss of Cargo, 772 F. Supp. 707, 710-11(D.P.R.1991) (applying transferee 
law to determine which state's marine insurance contract law to adopt in an admiralty case), 
and permanent transfers, see Wegbreit, 793 F. Supp. at 968-69; TBG, [1991-1992 Transfer 
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. {CCH) at 92,921-23; cf. Duke v. Touche Ross & Co., 765 F. Supp. 
69, 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (applying transferee law to a borrowed statute of limitations question 
because the issue is procedural). However, the borrowed statute of limitations cases involve 
federal law in an area where federal law is concededly not uniform. See Eckstein, 8 F.3d at 
1126-27. As a consequence, the cases applying transferor law are not inconsistent with Ko-
rean Air Lines. See Eckstein, 8 F.3d at 1126 (accepting the rule that transferee federal law 
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Plumbing Fixtures case,192 which was the foundation for the appli-
cation of transferor law in the MDL context.193 The reasoning of 
Korean Air Lines, however, is suspect and leads to the wrong result 
in the MDL context. Part m examines the choice of law question 
in the context of permanent transfers and concludes, as Korean Air 
Lines did, that transferee federal law should apply. Part IV exam-
ines the question in the MDL context and concludes, contrary to 
Korean Air Lines, that transferor federal law should apply. 
m. CHorCE oF FEDERAL LAw AFrnR PERMANENT TRANsFERs 
As discussed in Part I, Van Dusen rests on two sets of rationales: 
the desire to preserve the plaintiff's venue and choice of law privi-
leges and the desire to be faithful to Erie. The attempt to dismiss 
Van Dusen as based exclusively on Erie concerns is not profitable. 
Van Dusen, as viewed through the lens of Ferens, expresses three 
concerns that are potentially applicable to transfers in cases with 
federal issues. Transfers should not (i) disturb preexisting choice of 
law advantages accruing to the plaintiff, (ii) give the defendant an 
incentive to seek transfer for the purpose of obtaining more 
favorable law, or (iii) introduce choice of law considerations into 
transfer decisions.194 
Nevertheless, this Part argues in accordance with the prevailing 
view that the theoretical uniformity of federal law requires the ap-
plication of transferee federal law in the permanent transfer con-
text. This Part compares the role that choice of law principles play 
in the state and federal systems. In the state system, choice of law 
plays a significant role. There is, however, no analogous federal 
concept because federal law is theoretically uniform. On federal 
issues, the venue of appeal determines choice of law by default. 
This result serves substantial efficiency interests. Because there is 
no reason to distinguish transferred cases from other cases, trans-
feree federal law should apply after permanent transfers. Van Du-
sen and Ferens do not require a contrary result. 
should normally apply). Indeed, United Mine Workers was decided by a district court that 
was required to follow Korean Air Lines. 
192. See In re General Motors Class E Stock Buyout Sec. Litig., 696 F. Supp. 1546, 1547 
& n.1 (J.P.ML. 1988) (noting that "[w]hen determining whether to transfer an action under 
Section 1407 ..• it is not the business of the Panel to consider what law the transferee court 
might apply" and that "[a]ny suggestion to the contrary in [Plumbing Fixtures] is withdrawn" 
(citation omitted)). 
193. See supra text accompanying notes 154-57. 
194. See supra text accompanying note 109; Fmi, supra note 25, at 63-79 (arguing that the 
policies articulated in Van Dusen and Ferens are equally applicable in the federal issue 
context). 
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A. Choice of State Law 
When a plaintiff selects a state forum in a state law case, the 
plaintiff's choice of venue influences but is not determinative of 
choice of law. Rules of personal jurisdiction and venue limit the 
available fora. The doctrine of forum non conveniens allows states 
to dismiss cases that are otherwise brought in legitimate fora.19s 
Even when the plaintiff's choice of forum is the place of trial, the 
forum does not necessarily apply its own law to the substance of the 
controversy. One of the forum's first actions will be to apply choice 
of law rules that identify the applicable substantive law.196 
Conflicts principles in the early twentieth century were based on 
the vested rights theory and made choice of law dependent on the 
location of one legally relevant event.197 In tort, the First Conflicts 
Restatement applied the law of the place where the injury oc-
curred.198 In contract, the First Restatement applied the law of the 
place of contracting to resolve contract validity questions199 and the 
law of the place of performance to resolve questions regarding 
breach.200 The First Restatement's chief virtue was predictability. 
Its chief drawback was the inability to make individualized determi-
nations in particular cases. 
Modem choice of law theory has departed from vested rights 
theory and the single-factor analyses of the First Restatement. 
Modem choice of law is based on multifactor interest analyses that 
focus on the interests of the parties and the relevant sovereigns in 
having the laws of particular jurisdictions applied. Thus, the Sec-
ond Conflicts Restatement supports application of the law of the 
state with the most significant relationship to the litigation.201 
Although the Second Restatement's approach allows for individual-
ized choice of law determinations, it is inherently uncertain and un-
predictable. In light of the mixed costs and benefits of both the 
195. See supra text accompanying notes 132-33. 
196. See EuoENE F. ScoLES & PETER HAY, CoNFLICT OF LAWS §§ 3.1-.2 (2d ed. 1990); 
cf. Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 532 (1990) ("To a large extent .•• state conflicts-
of-law rules ••• ensure that appropriate laws will apply to diversity cases."). 
197. See ScoLES & HAY, supra note 196, § 17.2. 
198. See REsTATEMENT (FIRST} OF CoNFLICT OF LAws § 377 (1934); Kyle Brackin, Sal-
vaging the Wreckage: Multidistrict Litigation and Aviation, 51 J. AIR L. & CoM. 655, 673 n.81 
(1992). 
199. See REsTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 332 (1934). 
200. See REsTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 358 (1934). 
201. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNFLICT OF LAws §§ 6, 145 (1969). 
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Frrst and Second Restatement approaches, it should not be surpris-
ing that both have their adherents among the states.202 
In sum, in the state court system, choice of law principles restrict 
but do not eliminate the plaintiff's ability to choose the substantive 
law applicable to the case. Because the forum usually applies its 
own choice of law rules, the plaintiff has the ability to select a 
choice of law rule, as well as a particular state's interpretation of 
that rule, when choosing a venue.203 In cases with interstate ele-
ments that potentially identify more than one applicable law, this 
system gives the plaintiff some advantage, but the advantage is not 
absolute. 
The plaintiff's biggest choice of law advantage in state law cases 
is the ability to pick the procedural rules that will apply to the case. 
Although state courts employ choice of law rules to identify the 
applicable substantive law, they usually employ domestic law on 
questions of procedure. The United States Constitution places 
some limits, albeit not very restrictive ones, on a state's ability to 
apply its own law to the substance of a controversy.204 There is, 
however, no constitutional limit on a state's ability to apply its own 
law to procedural questions.205 Most significantly, state courts usu-
ally apply their own law on limitations questions without regard to 
which state's substantive law applies.206 It is, therefore, not surpris-
202. In 1983, Professor Herma Hill Kay surveyed the choice of law approaches of all fifty 
states. See Herma Hill Kay, Theory into Practice: Choice of Law in the Courts, 34 MERCER 
L. REv. 521, 591-92 (1983). Her conclusions are enlightening: Kentucky and Michigan apply 
the forum law approach, see id. at 579-81; twenty-one states and the District of Columbia 
follow the traditional approach of the First Restatement, see id. at 582-84; fourteen states 
follow the Second Restatement's most significant relationship test, see id. at 552-62; New 
York and North Dakota apply the center of gravity approach, see id. at 525-38; California and 
New Jersey use the governmental interest approach, see id. at 538-52; Minnesota, New 
Hampshire, and Wisconsin apply Lefiar's "better law" method, see id. at 562-72; and six 
states combine a number of modem methods, see id. at 572-78. One Supreme Court Justice 
described this choice of law landscape as "kaleidoscopic." See Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 
U.S. 516, 538 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
203. Under the doctrine of renvoi, the forum can choose to defer to the choice of law 
rules of the jurisdiction that the forum's choice of law rules initially identified. See SCOLES & 
HAY, supra note 196, § 3.13. American courts, however, employ renvoi only in limited cir-
cumstances. Id. at 67 & n.2. 
204. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 821-22 (1985) (holding that for a 
state to apply its own substantive law it must have a " 'significant contact or significant aggre-
gation of contacts'" to the litigation (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 313 
(1981) (plurality opinion))). 
205. See Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 722-29 (1988). For a thoughtful critique 
of Sun Oi~ see Louise Weinberg, Choosing Law: The Limitations Debate, 1991 U. ILL. L. 
REv. 683, 712-23 (arguing that interest analysis should apply to limitations questions). 
206. See Sun Oi~ 486 U.S. at 722-29. Limitations questions are substantive for Erie pur-
poses. See Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 532-34 (1949) 
(holding that the tolling of a statute of limitations is substantive); Guaranty 'Ihlst Co. v. York, 
326 U.S. 99, 108-10 (1945) (holding that the length of a limitations period is substantive). 
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ing that an inordinate number of transfer cases have involved limi-
tations issues.201 
Thus, choice of law in the state law context represents a care-
fully calibrated system that balances the plaintiff's privileges 
against the rights of the defendant and the needs of the judicial 
system. To the extent that a plaintiff has any residual leverage over 
choice of law after application of the rules of jurisdiction and venue, 
it is a fair inference that the system intends this leverage. The state 
law regime consciously confers on the plaintiff what can fairly be 
described as a qualified choice of law privilege. Because federal 
courts exercising diversity jurisdiction seek to respect state sover-
eignty and to achieve uniformity of result between federal and state 
courts in the same location, it is understandable that federal courts 
apply the choice of law rules of the local state courts and protect 
the plaintiff's choice of law privilege.2os 
B. Choice of Federal Law 
The process by which federal district courts determine which cir-
cuit's law to apply is entirely different. For illustrative purposes, let 
us return to the hypothetical posed at the outset of this article.209 
Suppose a plaintiff files a claim pursuant to section 14(a) of the 
Securities Exchange Act in a federal court in New York and the 
case is never transferred. In determining the degree of fault neces-
sary to establish li~bility, the district court does not ask where the 
injury occurred or which circuit has the most significant relationship 
to the litigation. Indeed, the district court does not apply any 
choice of law rule. The district court applies the Second Circuit's 
precedents because the Second Circuit is the court that will hear 
any appeal of the case.210 
Traditionally, however, the states have treated these questions as procedural. See Sun Oil, 
486 U.S. at 722-29; see also Duke v. Touche Ross & Co. 765 F. Supp. 69, 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1991} 
(applying transferee law to a federal limitations issue because the issue was one of proce-
dure). In an attempt to prevent litigants from choosing a local forum with no relation to the 
litigation to take advantage of the forum's limitations law, some states have adopted borrow-
ing statutes, which preclude claims that are barred under the law of the jurisdiction that 
governs the substance of the controversy. See ScoLES & HAY, supra note 196, § 3.11. 
207. See, e.g., Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 519-21 (1990); see generally Currie, 
Change of Venue, supra note 3, at 470-82 (discussing the effect of transfer on applicable state 
limitations law); supra notes 149, 191. 
208. See supra text accompanying notes 165-67. 
209. See supra text accompanying notes 6-10. 
210. See, e.g., Hasbrouck v. Texaco, Inc., 663 F.2d 930, 933 (9th Cir. 1981) {holding that a 
district court is required to obey the circuit court that reviews its decisions), cert. denied, 459 
U.S. 828 {1982); United States v. Barrientos, 485 F. Supp. 789, 792-93 (E.D. Pa. 1980) {"I 
follow [the law of the Third Circuit] ..• not because I subscribe to it but because, sitting in 
Philadelphia, I am required to do so, just as a district judge sitting in Miami must follow the 
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In the absence of controlling Supreme Court authority, a federal 
district court applies its best view of federal law in light of its cir-
cuit's precedents. On federal issues, the venue of appeal deter-
mines choice of law by default. This default rule obtains because 
federal law is the creation of a single sovereign and is, therefore, 
uniform in theory.211 Asking a choice of law question with respect 
to federal issues is a logical nonsequitur. 
The uniformity of federal law is, of course, a myth.212 As Pro-
fessor Marcus's competence principle suggests, the thirteen federal 
courts of appeals are not required to defer to each other.213 Until 
the Supreme Court intervenes, each circuit court remains free to 
apply its best view of federal law. Although the Supreme Court 
exists in part to resolve differences among the circuits,214 the 
Supreme Court is able to hear only a tiny fraction of the cases in 
which certiorari is sought.215 The Supreme Court cannot guarantee 
the uniformity of federal law on any but the most significant federal 
Fifth Circuit ••.• "); Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the 
7Wo Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REv. 205, 258 n.170 (1985) (arguing that 
"[c]urrent rules of precedent" are governed "by the mechanisms of review that Congress 
provides for"); Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Prece-
dents?, 46 STAN. L REv. 817, 824-25 (1994) (noting that in the federal system "[a] court must 
follow the precedents established by the court(s) directly above it" but may "ignore prece-
dents established by other courts so long as they lack revisory jurisdiction over it"). 
211. See, e.g., Samuel Estreicher & Richard L Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal Ad-
ministrative Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679, 726-27 (1989). 
212. See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 17, at 686 (noting that the federal "system is not ideal; 
historical development and current necessity make conflicts among the circuits inevitable"); 
id. at 691 (collecting cases that demonstrate circuit conflicts in securities cases); Burt 
Neubome, The Binding Quality of Supreme Court Precedent, 61 Tm .. L. REv. 991, 997 (1987) 
(calling the uniformity theory "hopelessly naive"). But see Seidelson, supra note 36, at 89 
(arguing that disparities in federal law are temporary). 
213. See Marcus, supra note 17, at 702; supra notes 160-71 and accompanying text; see 
also, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, Specialized Courts and the Administrative Lawmaking System, 
138 U. PA. L. REY. 1111, 1155 (1990). The current structure of the federal court system 
derives from the Evarts Act of 1891, which established the modem courts of appeals. See 
Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826. 
214. See SUP. Cr. R. 10.l(a) (citing the existence of a circuit conflict as a ground for 
granting certiorari); ROBERT L. STERN ET AL., SUPREME CouRT PRACTICE 168-73 (7th ed. 
1993). 
215. See The Supreme Court, 1992 Term - Leading Cases, 107 HARv. L REv. 144, 376 
(1993) (showing that during the 1992 Term the Supreme Court disposed of 119 cases by 
written opinion and 107 cases by memorandum decision out of the 6336 cases in which review 
was sought). 
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questions.216 Even where the Supreme Court is able to resolve in-
tercircuit conflicts, the delay is often substantial.217 
Attempts to unify federal law without the intervention of the 
Supreme Court have also been unavailing. The drive to establish a 
new federal appeals court to resolve differences among the cir-
cuits218 has been unsuccessful.219 It has been suggested, by analogy 
to intracircuit practice, that every federal appeals court should de-
fer to the first appeals court that decides any question.220 However, 
no circuit currently holds the view that precedents of other circuits 
should be treated as binding authority.221 The federal circuits have 
adopted this position because the benefits of intercircuit dialogue 
are thought to outweigh the costs of fragmentation of federal law 
216. See Beaulieu v. United States, 497 U.S. 1038 (1990) (White, J., dissenting) (arguing 
that certiorari should be granted in a case that presents a circuit conflict, and noting that SS 
other conflicts among the state and federal courts were not resolved by the Court during the 
1989 Term); Byron R White, A Salute to the Circuits, 28 l.oY. L. REv. 669, 670 (1982) ("[T]he 
courts of appeals these days are in large part - and necessarily so - finally responsible for 
the interpretation and enforcement, and hence for the condition, of the federal law."); see 
also Paul D. Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat to the 
Function of Review and the National Law, 82 l:IARv. L. REv. S42, S80 (1969) ("The 'law of 
the circuit' has emerged as a response to the Supreme Court's incapacity to resolve intracir-
cuit conflicts."). But see GERHARD CASPER & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE WORKLOAD OF 
nm SuPREME CoURT 89-90 (1976) (arguing that the Supreme Court is able to resolve all but 
a small percentage of genuine circuit conflicts). 
217. See Matthew Diller & Nancy Morawetz, Intracircuit Nonacquiescence and the Break-
down of the Rule of Law: A Response to Estreicher and Revesz, 99 YALE LJ. 801, 811 (1990); 
Marcus, supra note 17, at 688 & n.74. 
218. See Samuel Estreicher & John E. Sexton, A Managerial Theory of the Supreme 
Court's Responsibilities: An Empirical Study, S9 N.Y.U. L. REv. 681, 684-96, 813-22 (1984); 
Marcus, supra note 17, at 689 n.82 (describing bills that would have created a temporary 
Intercircuit Tribunal of the U.S. Courts of Appeals); Daniel J. Meador, The Federal Judiciary 
- Inflation, Malfunction, and a Proposed Course of Action, 1981 B.Y.U. L. REv. 617, 625-37 
(discussing various proposals for a national court of appeals); Sanford Canst-Ellenbogen, 
Note, Using Choice of Law Rules to Make Intercircuit Conflicts Tolerable, S9 N.Y.U. L. REv. 
1078, 1085-86 (1984). 
219. See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 163, at 6 (noting that Congress, in enacting the Fed-
eral Courts Improvements Act of 1982, rejected the recommendation of the Hruska Commis-
sion to create a new appellate court to handle cases referred by the Supreme Court). 
220. See William J. Brennan, Jr., Some thoughts on the Supreme Court's workload, 66 
JUDICATURE 230, 232, 23S (1983) (noting that Justice White has endorsed this proposal); 
Walter V. Schaefer, Reducing Circuit Conflicts, 69 A.B.A. J. 452, 455 (1983); Caust-
Ellenbogen, supra note 218, at 1090; Note, Securing Uniformity in National Law: A Proposal 
for National Stare Decisis in the Courts of Appeals, 87 YALE LJ. 1219, 1240-46 .(1978). 
221. See Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 211, at 736 & n:275. I do not mean to suggest 
that the federal circuits disregard the decisions of their sister circuits. The creation of an 
intercircuit conflict is a factor suggesting the need for en bane review. See, e.g., Douglas H. 
Ginsburg & Donald Falk, The Court En Banc: 1981-1990, S9 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1008, 
1024-25 (1991) (describing the D.C. Circuit's practice and noting that this rule obtains in part 
because "fa] conflict between circuits is an embarrassment to a system of national law"); see 
also Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, The Uneasy Case Against Intracircuit Nonac-
quiescence: A Reply, 99 YALE LJ. 831, 834 & n.18 (1990) (collecting cases in which circuit 
courts recognized an obligation to accommodate the law of other circuits in the interests of 
national uniformity). 
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among the circuits.222 Permitting the courts of appeals to depart 
from the rulings of other circuits allows the law to develop.223 If 
courts of appeals continue to disagree over time, this fact signals the 
Supreme Court that an issue is ripe for review and aids the 
Supreme Court in resolving the issue.224 As a consequence, federal 
law is uniform within but not among circuits.225 
The absence of federal choice of law rules demonstrates that the 
federal courts are required to accept the myth of a uniform federal 
law. To return to our hypothetical, a district court in New York will 
apply the law of the Second Circuit in a federal securities case even 
if all the parties reside in Ohio and all relevant events occurred in 
Ohio. By any choice of law criteria, this result is absurd. However, 
the district court is not permitted to undertake a choice of law anal-
ysis. Even though federal law is not uniform in practice, the district 
court is required to pretend that it is.226 
To summarize, a federal district court in New York applies the 
law of the Second Circuit for only one reason: any appeal \vill lie to 
the Second Circuit. Although district judges have occasionally ig-
nored binding appellate precedent227 and recent commentators 
have questioned the duty of district courts to apply the law of re-
viewing appellate courts,228 there is hardly a more well-accepted 
222. See Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 211, at 736. But see Schaefer, supra note 220, at 
454. 
223. See Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 211, at 736-37. 
224. See id. 
225. See, e.g., Caminker, supra note 210, at 855; Diller & Morawetz, supra note 217, at 
805. 
226. See In re Pittsburgh & L.E.R.R. Co. Sec. & Antitrust Litig., 543 F.2d 1058, 1065 n.19 
(3d Cir. 1976) ("[F]ederal law .•• is assumed to be nationally uniform, whether or not it is in 
fact."); United States v. Barrientos, 485 F. Supp. 789, 792 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (arguing that" 'a 
conflict of law between the Circuits' is a misnomer" even when a "conflict of interpretations" 
exists). 
227. One Alabama district judge has refused to follow the Supreme Court's Establish-
ment Clause jurisprudence. See Jaffree v. Board of Sch. Commrs., 554 F. Supp. 1104, 1128 
(S.D. Ala.), modified sub nom Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 
466 U.S. 926 (1984), affd., 472 U.S. 38 (1985). District Judge William Cox was often unwilling 
to follow Fifth Circuit precedent in voting rights cases. See FRANK T. READ & LuCY S. 
McGouGH, LET THEM BE JUDGED: THE JUDICIAL INTEGRATION OF THE DEEP Saum 293-
303 (1978). State courts have occasionally refused to follow Supreme Court rulings. See 
State v. Phillips, 540 P.2d 936, 938 (Utah 1975) (refusing to accept the incorporation doctrine 
as applied to the First Amendment), overruled by State v. Taylor, 664 P.2d 439, 448 n.4 (Utah 
1983). 
228. See Paul L. Colby, 7Wo Views on the Legitimacy of Nonacquiescence in Judicial 
Opinions, 61 Tm_ L. REv. 1041, 1058 (1987) (noting that the duty of lower courts to follow 
the precedents of higher courts is "not compulsory but suasive"); Michael Stokes Paulsen, 
Accusing Justice: Some Variations on the Themes of Robert M. Cover's Justice Accused, 7 J .L. 
& REuGION 33, 85 (1989); see also Caminker, supra note 210, at 856-65 (exploring the ques-
tion but concluding, after a review of the relevant literature, that district courts generally 
apply the law of reviewing appellate courts). 
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procedural rule. A trial court's duty to follow the precedents of a 
court with appellate jurisdiction flows from substantial efficiency 
concems.229 This practice saves resources at both the trial and ap-
pellate levels.230 The district court does not have to reconsider any 
questions decided by the appellate court. Following precedent ob-
viates the need for appeals. It also allows the parties to obtain the 
result that the appellate court would require at the earliest possible 
time.231 A contrary rule would have a substantial differential im-
pact on poor parties.232 Whereas rich parties would have the ability 
to get errant district court decisions reversed, poorer parties might 
lack the financial resources for an appeal they know they could win. 
The rule that the venue of appeal determines the applicable fed-
eral law obtains in fora other than the district courts. The United 
States Tax Court hears cases in which a taxpayer wishes to chal-
lenge a .ruling of the Internal Revenue Service prior to paying the 
tax.233 An appeal from the Tax Court lies to the court of appeals 
where the taxpayer resides.234 For many years, the Tax Court took 
the position that, unlike the district courts, it had a nationwide man-
date to apply the tax laws uniformly and was, therefore, not re-
quired to defer to the precedents of any court of appeals.235 This 
229. For an argument that the duty to follow Supreme Court precedent flows directly 
from the requirements of Article III, see Caminker, supra note 210, at 828-34. See also id. at 
838-39 (rejecting the argument that the duty to follow the precedents of courts with appellate 
jurisdiction flows directly from the statutes creating such jurisdiction). Although Caminker 
questions the strength of a number of rationales, he ultimately concludes that courts should 
follow the precedents of courts with appellate jurisdiction in most cases. See id. at 839-43, 
865-67. 
230. See id. at 839-40. 
231. See id. at 843-45. In Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 
U.S. 477 (1989), the Supreme Court noted that the inferior federal courts must follow ex-
isting Supreme Court precedent even when they believe that the Supreme Court would over-
rule such precedent. See 490 U.S. at 484. The Supreme Court issued this rebuke in Shearson 
even as it overruleq a prior case, as the Fifth Circuit had predicted it would. See 490 U.S. at 
479-84. Shearson should not be taken as a contradiction of the policy that trial courts should 
strive to mirror the results that are most likely to prevail on appeal. The Shearson Court may 
simply have believed that the costs of inaccurate predictions that prior precedents would be 
overruled outweighed the benefits of accurate predictions. Because the Supreme Court usu-
ally declines to overrule its prior cases, see, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 
2791, 2808-16 (1992) (discussing the doctrine of stare decisis), the safer practice is to require 
obedience to all higher authority until such time as it is the ple115ure of the superior court to 
reconsider. 
232. Cf. Diller & Morawetz, supra note 217, at 812 (discussing this principle in the con-
text of agency nonacquiescence); Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 211, at 749-50 (same). 
233. See 26 U.S.C. § 6213(a) (1988). A taxpayer who is willing to pay any required tax 
prior to filing suit may seek a refund in either district court or the U.S. Claims Court. $ee 28 
U.S.C. § 1346(a)(l) (1988). 
234. See 26 U.S.C. § 7482(b)(l)(A) (1988). 
235. See Lawrence v. Commissioner, 27 T.C. 713, 716-17 (1957), revd., 258 F.2d 562 (9th 
Cir. 1958). . 
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position was sharply criticized by the circuit courts.236 In Go/sen v. 
Commissioner, 237 the Tax Court changed course and agreed to fol-
low the precedents of the circuit court with appellate jurisdiction.23s 
It did so for the same efficiency reasons that district courts obey 
circuit courts with appellate jurisdiction.239 
The rule that the venue of appeal determines applicable federal 
law also obtains in the administrative agency context. Many agen-
cies have national jurisdiction to administer legislative schemes that 
includes a quasi-judicial function. Congress often provides for judi-
cial review of such determinations. In some circumstances the 
venue of judicial appeal is definite, and in others it is not.240 When 
the venue of appeal is definite, the comnion agency practice is to 
apply the law of the appellate forum.241 
Prior to 1985, the Social Security Administration (SSA) refused 
in its adjudicatory proceedings to apply the law of the judicial fo-
rum with appellate jurisdiction. Claimants who are denied social 
security benefits have the right to appeal to the federal district 
court where they reside.242 Nevertheless, the SSA took the view 
that it was not bound by the precedents of the federal circuit in 
which the claimant resided and that as the administrator of a na-
236. See, e.g., Stacey Mfg. v. Commissioner, 237 F.2d 605, 606 (6th Cir. 1956) ("[T]he Tax 
Court of the United States is not lawfully privileged to disregard and refuse to follow ••• the 
settled law of [this] circuit •••. "). 
237. 54 T.C. 742 (1970), affd., 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 940 (1971). 
238. See Go/sen, 54 T.C. at 757. The Tax Court may still have greater leeway than a 
district court to depart from the precedents of the circuit court with appellate jurisdiction. 
The Tax Court is only required to follow relevant circuit decisions that are squarely on point. 
See Sirbo Holdings, Inc. v. Commissioner, 476 F.2d 981, 989 (2d Cir. 1973); Go/sen, 54 T.C. at 
757. In Lardas v. Commissioner, 99 T.C. 490 (1992), the Tax Court recently took a very 
narrow view of when circuit precedents are squarely on point. Lardas, 99 T.C. at 494-95. For 
a critique of the Lardas case and its implications for forum shopping, see Donald B. Tobin, 
Note, The Tax Court Revisits the Golsen Rule: Lardas v. Commissioner, 47 TAX LAW. 559 
(1994). 
239. See Go/sen, 54 T.C. at 757 (adopting the new rule in the interest of "efficient and 
harmonious judicial admfuistration"). 
240. See Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 211, at 687. 
241. See In re Anselmo, Interim Decision 3105 (Bureau of Immigration Appeals May 11, 
1989), reprinted in 66 INTERPRETER RELEASES 598 (1989) (rejecting the nonacquiescence 
policy in deportation proceedings); Davis Metal Stamping, Inc., 12 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1259, 
1261 (Occupational Safety and Health Rev. Commn. Apr. 15, 1985) (applying the law of the 
circuit to which the party said it would appeal), affd., 800 F.2d 1351 (5th Cir. 1986); Diller & 
Morawetz, supra note 217, at 801 n.1 (noting that most agencies "that are certain which cir-
cuit will review their decisions generally practice intracircuit acquiescence"); Estreicher & 
Revesz, supra note 211, at 716 (noting that when review of agency action is vested in a single 
court of appeals, most agencies will apply the law of that court). 
242. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1988). A claimant may also appeal in the district in which its 
principal place of business is located. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1988). The overwhelming ma-
jority of cases, however, are appealed in the district of the claimant's residence. See Es-
treicher & Revesz, supra note 211, at 694. 
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tional scheme, it was entitled to apply its best view of federal law in 
light of Supreme Court authority.243 
The SSA's position - that it would not defer to the precedents 
of the judicial fora to which its cases would be appealed - is usu-
ally referred to as nonacquiescence.244 The SSA's policy caused a 
national uproar. It was condemned by the courts245 and commenta-
tors.246 Two United States Attorneys refused to represent the Gov-
ernment in SSA nonacquiescence cases. The strength of the 
reaction to the nonacquiescence view demonstrates the substantial 
importance of the efficiency concerns that require adherence to the 
precedents of a court with appellate jurisdiction.247 The SSA, un-
like the federal district courts and .the Tax Court, is not part of the 
243. See Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 211, at 694-97. Since 1985, the SSA has soft-
ened its nonacquiescence policy. See id. at 697-99. 
244. See Diller & Morawetz, supra note 217, at 801. The Internal Revenue Service, Fed-
eral Labor Relations Authority, Federal Trade Commission, and Merit Systems Protection 
Board also have policies that pennit a certain amount of nonacquiescence. See Estreicher & 
Revesz, supra note 211, at 713-14, 718. To be distinguished from the policies of these agen-
cies is that of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), which supervises a scheme in 
which the venue of judicial appeal is uncertain. See id. at 709. In this circumstance, although 
it has also been criticized by the courts, see id. at 710-12, the NLRB would seem justified in 
refusing to apply the precedents of the inferior federal courts. See Diller & Morawetz, supra 
note 217, at 802 n.8; Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 211, at 735-43. Congress would do well, 
however, to change the statutory scheme to provide for a definite appellate venue so that the 
agency could know where judicial appeals would lie and apply the rules of that circuit. See id. 
at 764-70. 
245. See Schisler v. Heckler, 787 F.2d 76, 84-85 (2d Cir. 1986) (noting that the SSA repre-
sented that it was currently following Second Circuit law and enjoining the SSA to follow 
Second Circuit law with respect to claimants residing in the Second Circuit on that basis); 
Lopez v. Heckler, 725 F.2d 1489 (9th Cir.) (affirming a preliminary injunction against the 
SSA's nonacquiescence policy), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 469 U.S. 1082 
(1984); Stieberger v. Heckler, 615 F. Supp. 1315 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (granting a preliminary 
injunction against the SSA's nonacquiescence policy), vacated sub nom Stieberger v. Bowen, 
801F.2d29 (2d Cir.1986) (vacating the injunction based on Schisler); Thomas v. Heckler, 598 
F. Supp. 492 (M.D. Ala. 1984) (enjoining the SSA's nonacquiescence policy); Holden v. 
Heckler, 584 F. Supp. 463 (N.D. Ohio 1984) (same); see also Diller & Morawetz, supra note 
217, at 801 n.2 (collecting cases condemning agency nonacquiescence). In Hyatt v. Heckler, 
579 F. Supp. 985 (D.N.C. 1984), the district court's injunction against the SSA's nonacquies-
cence policy was vacated by the court of appeals, 757 F.2d 1455 (4th Cir. 1985), whose judg-
ment was in tum vacated by the Supreme Court, Hyatt v. Bowen, 476 U.S. 1167 (1986). 
Although the Fourth Circuit did not reinstate the injunction on remand, it strongly disap-
proved of the SSA's nonacquiescence policy. See Hyatt v. Heckler, 807 F.2d 376, 379 (4th 
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 820 (1987). 
246. See Diller & Morawetz, supra note 217; Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 211, at 681 
n.8 (collecting authorities). Even those commentators who oppose a per se ban on agency 
nonacquiescence suggest that agencies may refuse to follow the precedeJ!ts of judicial fora 
with appellate jurisdiction only in very limited circumstances. See id. at 683, 743-53 (arguing 
that an agency may engage in intracircuit nonacquiescence only when it has a reasonable 
prospect of obtaining a change in the law). 
247. See Diller & Morawetz, supra note 217, at 812-17. Constitutional arguments have 
also been advanced to support the same result. See Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 211, at 
718-35 (collecting constitutional arguments and arguing that such concerns do not justify a 
per se ban on agency nonacquiescence). 
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federal judicial system.248 Arguably, the SSA, as the administrator 
of a national program, has a much greater procedural and substan-
tive interest in the uniformity of the federal law it administers than 
the federal district courts.249 Perhaps the SSA should have been 
permitted to apply whatever scheme comported with its best view 
of federal law, subject only to the perils of being reversed in a court 
that Congress endowed with appellate jurisdiction. Nevertheless, 
the SSA's nonacquiescence program elicited strong passions and 
has been widely viewed as beyond the pale. 
The rule that the venue of appeal determines applicable federal 
law also obtains within the state court system.25o State courts are 
often required to determine federal questions. They usually have 
concurrent jurisdiction over federal question cases,251 some of 
which are not removable.252 Absent diversity of citizenship, state 
courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over federal issues in 
cases in which the plaintiff's well-pleaded complaint raises only 
state law questions.253 When a state court decides federal issues, it 
owes no fealty to the inferior federal courts in its region, including 
the local court of appeals.254 State trial courts owe obedience on 
federal issues only to the higher state courts and the Supreme Court 
of the United States. This result obtains because the inferior fed-
eral courts do not lie in the path of appellate review.255 
248. See Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 221, at 839-40 (rejecting the "analogy between 
administrative agencies and district courts"). 
249. See id. at 840. 
250. See Caminker, supra note 210, at 825. 
251. There is a strong presumption in favor of such state court jurisdiction. See, e.g., Gulf 
Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 477-78 (1981); Charles Dowd Box Co. v. 
Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 507-08 (1962). 
252. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1988) (denying the removal of Securities Act claims); 28 
U.S.C. § 1445 (1988) (denying the removal of certain labor cases). 
253. The federal district courts do not have original jurisdiction over cases where federal 
issues are introduced only by way of defense. See, e.g., Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction 
Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. l, 9-12 (1983); Gully v. First Natl. Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 113 
(1936); Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152-54 (1908). 
254. See, e.g., Freeman v. Lane, 962 F.2d 1252, 1258 (7th Cir. 1992); Bromley v. Crisp, 561 
F.2d 1351, 1354 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978); United States ex rel. Law-
rence v. Woods, 432 F.2d 1072, 1075-76 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 983 (1971); 
Owsley v. Peyton, 352 F.2d 804, 805 (4th Cir. 1965); Alicia T. v. County of L.A., 271 Cal. 
Rptr. 513, 517 (a. App. 1990); Bradshaw v. State, 286 So. 2d 4, 6 (Fla.1973), cert. denied, 417 
U.S. 919 (1974); State v. Coleman, 214 A.2d 393, 402-04 (N.J. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 950 
(1966); Penrod Drilling Corp. v. Williams, 868 S.W.2d 294, 296 (Tex. 1993). 
255. In criminal matters, Congress has provided for habeas corpus review of federal is-
sues in the inferior federal courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1988). As a consequence, in this 
context it makes eminent good sense for the state courts to follow the local federal court of 
appeals. See Commonwealth v. Negri, 213 A.2d 670, 672 (Pa. 1965). One court recently 
suggested that the Supremacy Clause requires state courts to follow the precedents of the 
federal court of appeals with habeas review power. See Fretwell v. Lockhart, 946 F.2d 571, 
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In sum, the venue of appeal determines choice of law on federal 
issues. Although Marcus's competence principle is an element of 
the analysis, it provides only a partial explanation for the result. 
The core idea is that in the absence of federal choice of law rules, 
efficiency concerns require the application of the law of the court 
with appellate jurisdiction. I call this view the "appellate model." 
As demonstrated below, the appellate model confirms the well-
accepted view that transferee federal law should apply after perma-
nent transfers. As Part IV demonstrates, however, the appellate 
model requires a different result in the context of MDL transfers. 
C. The Effect of Permanent Transfer 
Now suppose, in accordance with our hypothetical, that a fed-
eral court in New York decides, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), to 
transfer a case brought under section 14(a) of the Securities Ex-
change Act to a federal court in Ohio. Should the transferee court 
apply the law of the Second Circuit, which allows the plaintiff to 
prevail on a showing of negligence, or the Sixth Circuit, which re-
quires proof of scienter? 
The law of the Sixth Circuit should apply, and the district court 
should hold that proof of scienter is required. If the complaint al-
leges only negligence, the district court should dismiss the com-
plaint.256 The determining factor in choice of federal law is the site 
of appellate jurisdiction. Because any appeal will be heard by the 
Sixth Circuit, the district court in Ohio should apply the Sixth Cir-
cuit's view of federal law, just as it would for cases originally com-
menced in its court.257 Allowing the plaintiff to proceed on a 
negligence theory would potentially waste substantial resources. 
Because the Sixth Circuit is not required to follow the Second, ap-
plying the Second Circuit's view on this question would invite cer-
tain reversal if the plaintiff wins.2Ss 
577 (8th Cir. 1991), revd. on other grounds, 113 S. Ct. 838 (1993). This assertion, however, 
seems questionable. See Lockhart v. Fretwell, 113 S. Ct. 838, 846 (1993) (Thomas, J., 
concurring). 
256. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 190 & n.S (1976) (requiring proof of 
scienter in connection with Rule lOb-5 claims and affirming the dismissal of a complaint 
alleging only negligence). 
257. See Greyhound Fm. Corp. v. Willyard, No. 87-C-0911B, 1989 WL 201094, at *14 (D. 
Utah Dec. 26, 1989) (applying transferee federal law after a permanent transfer because the 
transferee court of appeals would be the appellate forum); Satellite Fin. Planning Corp. v. 
First Natl. Bank, 633 F. Supp. 386, 393-94 (D. Del. 1986) (applying transferee federal law 
after a permanent transfer to avoid the anomaly of the transferee circuit having to disregard 
its established precedents). 
258. See Joan Steinman, Law of the Case: A Judicial Puzzle in Consolidated and Trans-
ferred Cases and in Multidistrict Litigation, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 595, 641-48 (1987) (arguing 
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The concerns of Van Dusen and Ferens do not require a differ-
ent result. By contrast to the state law contex~. the plaintiff has no 
choice of law privilege with respect to federal law. Unlike the state 
system, the plaintiff's residual ability to influence applicable federal 
law is not the result of a carefully calibrated system. The plaintiff's 
choice of venue usually determines choice of law by default, not 
because the plaintiff has any entitlement to this result. The plaintiff 
had access to the Second Circuit's law only because of the broad 
venue provisions of the Securities Exchange Act.259 However, 
Congress also created section 1404(a) as a limitation on these venue 
provisions. As a consequence, the plaintiff has no legitimate cause 
for complaint if transfer changes applicable federal law. 
The rule that transferee federal law should apply does not vio-
late the concern of Van Dusen and Ferens that transfer decisions 
should be determined by efficiency rather than choice of law con-
siderations. Because the uniformity of federal law is accepted as a 
given, applicable federal law is deemed to remain unchanged after 
transfer. As a consequence, any detriment to the plaintiff receives 
no weight in the transfer calculus because, by hypothesis, no detri-
ment exists.26° 
Nor is this result unfair. The absence of choice of law rules with 
respect to federal issues gives the plaintiff a significant litigation ad-
vantage. The plaintiff is often presented with a wide range of venue 
options, and the plaintiff's initial choice of forum is entitled to re-
spect. The defendant has the burden of overcoming the presump-
tion in favor of the plaintiff's choice of venue.261 Because the 
plaintiff is the first actor in the venue process, the plaintiff has a 
greater ability than the defendant to influence venue and, as a con-
sequence, choice of law.262 Any detriment to plaintiffs in trans-
ferred cases would seem at least offset by the plaintiff's ability to 
choose the applicable federal law in cases that are not transferred. 
that transferee federal law should apply to prevent reversal in the transferee court of ap· 
peals}. We might, of course, depart from the principle of competence and require the Sixth 
Circuit to apply the Second Circuit's law on the standard of fault required in § 14(a) actions. 
This rule, however, would have all the costs that a similar rule would have in the MDL 
context and none of the compensating benefits. See infra section IV.C. Unlike in the MDL 
context, the Second Circuit would have no ability to review the case to determine if the 
courts in the Sixth Circuit applied its law correctly. See infra text accompanying note 340. 
259. See supra note 9. 
260. See supra text accompanying notes 136-45. 
261. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
262. Thus, although Marcus argued that venue established choice of law by default in 
diversity cases, see supra text accompanying notes 162-68, venue actually plays a greater role 
in establishing choice of law with respect to federal issues. 
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The last of the Van Dusen-Ferens concerns presents a greater 
obstacle to the application of transferee federal law. Applying 
transferee federal law presents defendants with the prospect of ob-
taining a better law in some cases as a result of transfer. As a con-
sequence, defendants will have an incentive to ·seek transfer for 
reasons not related to trial efficiencies.263 Although the trial court 
has the power to deny transfer motions that are not founded on 
efficiency considerations, the system wastes resources in disposing 
of transfer motions that originate from choice of law concerns. 
Nevertheless, the fundamental assumptions of the federal sys-
tem require the application of transferee federal law. There is no 
choice of law with respect to federal law because federal law is the-
oretically uniform. Although this result does not obtain in practice, 
the lack of practical uniformity is a fact that federal courts are not 
permitted to consider. Were they allowed to admit the existence of 
variations in federal law, the creation of federal choice of law rules 
would be a necessity. Just as the theoretical uniformity of federal 
law outweighs choice of law considerations, it outweighs any effi-
ciency concern related to forum shopping by defendants. 
Perhaps the better practice would be to recognize the lack of 
uniformity of federal law with all its attendant implications. Fed-
eral courts might then create choice of law rules to determine appli-
cable circuit law.264 The plaintiff might receive a choice of law 
privilege that courts should protect in the transfer process, and fed-
eral choice of law rules might discourage defendants from forum 
shopping. Until the fundamental assumptions of the system 
change, however, courts should treat transfers in accordance with 
the same assumptions that govern cases that are not transferred, 
including the assumptions that a single federal law governs all fed-
eral issues and that the venue of appeal determines which circuit's 
law applies in district court. It is not so much that Van Dusen's 
policies are inapplicable in the federal issue context as that the fed-
eral courts are disabled from considering them. 
263. See Friendly, supra note 149, at 412 (noting that the application of transferee federal 
law encourages forum shopping by defendants). Although forum shopping usually has pejo-
rative overtones, see Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Venue Choice and Forum 
Shopping in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 1991 WIS. L. 
REv. 11, 14, we should not forget that an attorney's job is to give the client the greatest 
possible chance of winning, which includes selecting the forum that will apply the best law 
from the client's perspective. See Cheeseman v. Carey, 485 F. Supp. 203, 215 (S.D.N.Y.), 
affd. on other grounds, 623 F.2d 1387 (2d Cir. 1980); Purcell, supra note 35, at 449-51. 
264. See Caust-Ellenbogen, supra note 218, at 1091-98 (arguing for the application of 
choice of federal law rules based on the defendant's residence or principal place of business). 
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D. Conclusion 
In sum, as Clayton and Green suggest, transferee federal law 
should apply in the permanent transfer context as a consequence of 
the theoretical uniformity of federal law and the allocation of ap-
pellate jurisdiction within the federal court system.26S The progeny 
of Clayton and Green were correct to discount the significance of 
Van Dusen. The next Part examines the choice of law question in 
the MDL ·context and concludes that the special circumstances of 
MDL litigation require a different result. 
IV. CHOICE OF FEDERAL LAW AFrER MDL TRANSFERS 
This Part considers the choice of law question in the context.of 
MDL transfers and concludes, contrary to the emerging consensus 
view, that MDL courts should apply the law of the transferor circuit 
on federal questions. This result flows from the structure and pur-
poses of the MDL Act. The MDL Act contemplates a remand to 
the transferor court after the conclusion of pretrial proceedings. As 
a consequence, the transferor circuit is the ultimate appellate fo-
rum, and its law should apply during all phases of the case. More-
over, although there is little direct legislative history, the limited 
purposes of MDL transfers suggest that Congress did not desire 
MDL transfers to have outcome-determinative effects. 
A. The MDL Context 
1. Applying the Appellate Model 
The MDL Act allows the JPML to consolidate cases involving 
common questions of fact for pretrial purposes. The MDL venue 
need not be one in which the actions could have been brought as an 
original matter. The MDL court has exclusive jurisdiction over the 
transferred cases during the pretrial phase.266 At the conclusion of 
pretrial proceedings, pending cases are remanded to their original 
265. Because a pennanent transfer has the effect of changing the federal law applicable 
to the case, district courts should make transfer decisions as early in the proceedings as prac· 
ticable. See 1B JAMES WM. MooRE ET AL, MooRE's FEDERAL PRAcrICE 'I 0.404[4.·2] {2d 
ed. 1994). 
266. See In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 829 F.2d 1171, 1178 (D.C. Cir. 
1987) (D.H. Ginsburg, J., concurring), affd. sub nom. Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 
U.S. 122 (1989); Astarte Shipping Co. v. Allied Steel & Export Serv., 767 F.2d 86, 87 (5th Cir. 
1985); Eckstein v. Balcor Ftlm Investors, 740 F. Supp. 572, 574-75 (E.D. Wis. 1990). Because 
the MDL Act evinces Congress's desire for coordinated pretrial proceedings in the MDL 
court, the MDL judge has the power to rescind previous rulings made by the transferor dis-
trict judge. See, e.g., Astarte, 161 F.2d at 87; In re Upjohn Co. Antibiotic Cleocin Prods. Liab. 
Lltig., 664 F.2d 114, 118-20 {6th Cir. 1981). 
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fora for trial.267 After remand, any appeal from the final judgment 
lies in the circuit in which the trial court is located. 
Because the MDL Act contemplates that cases will be re-
manded to their original fora for trial and appeal, the MDL judge 
should apply transferor circuit law to all federal issues because the 
transferor circuit will have ultimate jurisdiction over any appeal of 
the case.268 This result is consistent with the rule that, due to the 
absence of federal choice of law principles, the venue of appeal de-
termines applicable circuit law. The application of transferor fed-
eral law in MDL cases is justified by the same efficiency 
considerations that require district courts to apply the precedents of 
their own circuits in cases that are not transferred and in cases that 
are permanently transferred under section 1404(a). Were an MDL 
court in Ohio to hold, in accordance with the Sixth Circuit's law, 
that section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act requires proof of 
scienter, the Second Circuit would overturn this result on ultimate 
appeal. As a consequence, after remand the federal district court in 
New York would probably vacate the MDL judge's ruling to save 
the Second Circuit the trouble and allow the trial to proceed in ac-
cordance with Second Circuit law.269 
267. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) {1988). 
268. Although there have been suggestions that one circuit court may not examine rul-
ings made by a district court in another circuit, see Steinman, supra note 258, at 644 n.159 
(collecting cases), it would seem that, because all interlocutory rulings may be reconsidered 
prior to final judgment, see FEo. R. CIV. P. 54(b ), the district court that enters final judgment 
in any case is deemed to endorse any previous rulings made in the case and the court of 
appeals that supervises the district court entering judgment is entitled to revise any errors on 
which the judgment rests. See Tel-Phonic Servs., Inc. v. TBS Intl., Inc., 975 F.2d 1134, 1138 
(5th Cir. 1992) (holding that the transferee court of appeals has jurisdiction to review pre-
transfer rulings by a district court in another circuit that were not reconsidered by the trans-
feree district court. after transfer); Steinman, supra note 258, at 646-47. As a consequence, 
after the remand of an MDL case, jurisdiction is exclusively in the remand court, final judg-
ment will be entered by the remand court, and the court of appeals that supervises the re-
mand court is entitled to inquire into all aspects of the case. See Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. 
LeMay, 448 F.2d 1341, 1345 (7th Cir.) (noting that errors made by the MDL judge "will be 
subject to review .•• at the time of the entry of judgment on the complaints in the suits in the 
ultimate trial forum" and that "[t]he transferor court .•. takes the case with all of its errors, if 
any, that may have fastened on the carcase theretofore"), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1001 (1971). 
269. Departing from earlier decisions to avoid appellate reversal is a well-accepted ex-
ception to the law of the case doctrine. See, e.g., Peterson v. Lindner, 765 F.2d 698, 704 (7th 
Cir. 1985); Loumar, Inc. v. Smith, 698 F.2d 759, 763 {5th Cir. 1983); Holzsager v. Valley 
Hosp., 482 F. Supp. 629, 633 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (refusing to accept the rulings of a transferor 
court in another circuit on a subject matter jurisdiction question because the law of the case 
doctrine "should not prevent the discharge of a judge's obligation to present an appellate 
court with the judgment he believes ought to be rendered in the case" (quoting Rodriguez v. 
Olaf Pedersen's Rederi AJS, 387 F. Supp. 754, 757 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), affd., 527 F.2d 1282 (2d 
Cir. 1975))); 1B MooRE ET AL, supra note 265, 'I 0.404[4.-2] (arguing that district courts 
should be hesitant to effect permanent transfers after substantial proceedings have occurred 
because of the potential for reexamination in the transferee court); Steinman, supra note 258, 
at 641-43 (arguing that a district court should reexamine federal decisions made by a district 
748 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 93:703 
2. Congressional Intent 
The application of transferor federal law in MDL cases is also 
consistent with the will of Congress.210 The MDL Act was passed 
in 1968271 in response to the thousands of electrical equipment 
price-fixing cases filed in the early 1960s under the federal antitrust 
laws. In these cases discovery proceedings were coordinated by the 
judiciary under a special procedure developed to avoid duplication 
of effort in the various federal districts involved.212 Sparse legisla-
tive history suggests that Congress gave little consideration to the 
choice of law problem but may have assumed that transferor law 
woUld apply.273 Professor Marcus has argued that this history is ir-
relevant in the federal issue context because the authors of these 
comments had diversity cases, the actual context in which Van Du-
sen was decided, in mind.274 As a more recent view contends, how-
ever, Congress passed the MDL Act with federal antitrust cases in 
mind, so there is no reason to believe that it assumed that trans-
feror law would apply only to diversity cases.21s 
Moreover, the actual legislation passed by Congress provides in-
sight into Congress's position on choice of law. The MDL scheme 
approved by Congress is quite limited. The MDL court has juris-
diction only over pretrial proceedings. Any subsequent proceed-
ings must be conducted in the transferor court after remand. 
Because of the limited scope of MDL proceedings, Congress al-
lowed MDL transfers to courts that would not have been legitimate 
original fora and, therefore, would not qualify as permanent trans-
court in another circuit to prevent reversal on appeal); id. at 704-05 (applying this principle 
after remand in MDL proceedings). 
270. By contrast, there is no indication that Congress directly considered this issue in 
1948 when it enacted § 1404(a). 
271. See Multidistrict Litigation Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-296, 82 Stat. 109 (codified as 
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1988)). 
272. See Phil C. Neal & Perry Goldberg, The Electrical Equipment Antitrust Cases: Novel 
Judicial Administration, 50 A.B.A. J. 621, 623-24 (1964); Lawrence J. Fleming, Note, The 
Problem of Venue in Multiple District Litigation, 41 NOTRE DAME LAw. 507, 518-19 (1966); 
see also Brackin, supra note 198, at 664; Stanley A. Weigel, The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict 
Litigation, Transferor Courts and Transferee Courts, 78 F.R.D. 575, 581 (1978). 
273. In connection with the hearings on the MDL Act, two witnesses with experience in 
the handling of the electrical equipment price-fixing cases testified that the Van Dusen rule 
would apply in MDL cases. See Multidistrict Litigation: Hearings on S. 3815 Before the Sub-
comm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1966) (testimony of Dean Phil Neal); id. at 25 (testimony of Judge William 
Becker). 
-274. See Marcus, supra note 17, at 710-11. 
275. See Cooper, supra note 24, at 1157-58. 
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feree courts.276 Congress explicitly considered and rejected the 
possibility of consolidating MDL cases for trial.211 It is hard to 
imagine that Congress contemplated that pretrial transfers to fora 
that lacked the ability to conduct trials would have outcome-
determinative effects.21s 
To be contrasted with the scheme Congress enacted are MDL 
schemes that give the MDL court greater powers. The Multiforum, 
Multiparty Jurisdiction Act of 1989 (MMJ Act),279 which has never 
become law, provides for permanent transfers to MDL fora to max-
imize the efficiencies inherent in consolidating mass tort cases.280 
As part of this scheme, the MMJ Act provides that a single law 
should apply to all state law issues and lists factors for courts to 
consider in selecting the applicable law.281 Thus, in state law cases, 
the MMJ Act would overrule Klaxon and provide the first federal 
choice of law principles.282 Federal issues are exempted from the 
276. Section 1404(a) permits a permanent transfer to any district "where [the case] might 
have been brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1988). The Supreme Court has interpreted this 
language to refer to fora that can exercise personal jurisdiction and venue without the de-
fendant's consent See Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335 (1960). 
277. Congress declined to order permanent consolidation for four reasons: (i) the experi-
ence of the electrical equipment price-fixing cases, on which the MDL Act was based, had 
been limited to coordinated pretrial proceedings; (ii) it might be impracticable to litigate all 
MDL cases in a single district; (iii) a trial in the original district would probably be more 
convenient for the parties and witnesses; and (iv) discovery proceedings in the original forum 
might be needed to supplement the MDL proceedings. See H.R. REP. No. 1130, 90th Cong., 
2d Sess. 4 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1898, 1901-02; George T. Conway III, Note, 
The Consolidation of Multistate Litigation in State Courts, 96 YALE LJ. 1099, 1108 n.45 
(1987). 
278. See In re Dow Co. "Sarabond" Prods. Liab. Litig., 666 F. Supp. 1466, 1469 (D. Colo. 
1987) (noting that "[a]pplication of the federal law of the transferor forum is supported by 
the very purpose of multidistrict litigation" because ''the ultimate aim of the transferee court 
is to return each case to its transferor jurisdiction in a state of readiness for trial"). 
279. H.R. 3406, lOlst Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 135 CoNG. REc. 23,302 (1989). The 
MMJ Act has been revised and reintroduced in each succeeding Congress. See Linda S. 
Mullenix, Unfinished Symphony: The Complex Litigation Project Rests, 54 LA. L. REv. 977, 
977 n.5 (1994) (collecting bills). 
280. See H.R. 3406, supra note 279, § 4, reprinted in 135 CoNG. REc. at 23,302; see also 
John F. Cooney, Note, The Experience of Transferee Courts Under the Multidistrict Litigation 
Act, 39 U. CHI. L. REv. 588, 611 (1972) (arguing tliat Congress should amend the MDL Act 
to allow for consolidated trials); Blake M. Rhodes, Comment, The Judicial Panel on Multidis-
trict Litigation: Time for Rethinking, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 711, 745-49 (1991) (arguing that 
Congress should amend the MDL Act to give the JPML the power to consolidate cases for 
trial). 
281. See H.R. 3406, supra note 279, § 6(a), reprinted in 135 CoNG. REc. at 23,303. 
282. Courts and commentators have often expressed a preference for federal choice of 
law rules in consolidated cases. See, e.g., Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 504 F.2d 400, 403 
(7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975); Mary Kay Kane, Drafting Choice of Law 
Rules for Complex Litigation: Some Preliminary Thoughts, 10 REv. LmG. 309 (1991). But 
see Robert A. Sedler & Aaron D. 1\verski, The Case Against All Encompassing Federal Mass 
Tort Litigation: Sacrifice Without Gain, 73 MARa. L. REv. 76 (1989) (arguing in favor of the 
Klaxon rule in mass tort cases). 
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choice of law provisions,283 presumably because transferee federal 
law would apply after the permanent transfers contemplated by the 
Act without reference to any choice of law rules.284 This result 
would be consistent with the weight of authority as well as sound 
theory. 
The American Law Institute's (ALI) Complex Litigation Pro-
ject similarly recommends altering the current MDL procedure to 
allow permanent consolidation of cases involving common ques-
tions of fact.285 Like the MMJ Act, the ALI proposes federal 
choice of law principles to govern state law issues.286 Unlike the 
MMJ Act, the ALi's proposal directly addresses the problem of in-
tercircuit conflicts on federal issues and adopts the position that 
transferee circuit law should apply.287 
Thus, broader MDL schemes allow for the permanent transfer 
and consolidation of related cases.288 Such schemes also have sig-
283. See H.R. 3406, supra note 279, § 6(a), reprinted in 135 CoNo. REc. at 23,303. 
284. The MMJ Act still has the potential to create some choice of law difficulties on 
federal issues. The MMJ Act consolidates cases in the MDL court for the purpose of ascer-
taining liability. At the conclusion of this phase of the case, the Act gives the MDL judge the 
power to proceed to the damages phase of the case or to remand the cases to their original 
fora for the ascertainment of damages. See H.R. 3406, supra note 279, § 4, reprinted in 135 
CoNo. REc. at 23,302. In state law cases, the Act provides that the law identified as applica-
ble by the MDL judge pursuant to the Act's choice of law provisions will continue to apply 
after remand. See H.R. 3406, supra note 279, § 6(c), reprinted in 135 CoNo. REc. at 23,303. 
On federal issues, however, the MMJ Act creates a dilemma similar to that now faced in 
MDL cases. After remand, should the original forum apply the law of its own circuit or the 
MDL circuit in fixing damages? If the MMJ Act becomes law, the better approach would 
seem to be to apply MDL circuit law after remand, because this circuit's law will apply on 
liability questions and a single circuit's law should apply to all issues in MDL cases. 
285. See CLP, supra note 149, § 3.06. The ALi's proposal includes the possibility that 
cases originally filed in federal court could be transferred to state court, which would then be 
the forum in which consolidated proceedings were ultimately conducted. See id. § 4.01; see 
also Conway, supra note 277, at 1107-12 (proposing that Congress amend the MDL Act to 
allow the consolidation of related cases for trial in state court and arguing that the transferee 
state court should be free to apply its own law). This reverse removal procedure was recently 
criticized in Joan Steinman, Reverse Remova~ 78 IowA L. REv. 1029 (1993). 
286. See CLP, supra note 149, § 6.01. The Louisiana Law Review recently dedicated a 
symposium issue to the Complex Litigation Project. Commentators supporting the ALi's 
choice of law scheme were P. John Kozyris, The Conflicts Provisions of the ALi's Complex 
Litigation Project: A Glass Half Full?, 54 LA. L REv. 953 (1994), and James A.R. Nafziger, 
Choice of Law in Air Disaster Cases: Complex Litigation Rules and the Common Law, 54 
LA. L. REv. 1001 {1994). In opposition were Friedrich K. Juenger, The Complex Litigation 
Project's Tort Choice-of-Law Rules, 54 LA. L. REv. 907 {1994); Robert A. Sedler, The Com-
plex Litigation Project's Proposal for Federally-Mandated Choice of Law in Mass Tort Cases: 
Another Assault on State Sovereignty, 54 LA. L REv. 1085 (1994); and David E. Seidelson, 
Section 6.01 of the ALi's Complex Litigation Project: Function Follows Form, 54 LA. L. REv. 
1111 {1994). 
287. See CLP, supra note 149, § 6.08. 
288. In addition to the MDL schemes described in the text, there have been proposals to 
exercise federal subject matter jurisdiction in aviation cases, see Brackin, supra note 198, at 
702-09, and in cases in which any defendant has a residence in a state other than the one 
where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, see 
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nifi.cant choice of law implications. The MMJ Act and the ALI 
both propose federal choice of law rules to identify applicable state 
law to enhance the efficiency of the MDL procedures. The MMJ 
Act implies, and the ALi's Complex Litigation Project states, that 
transferee federal law would apply in consolidated cases. The ap-
plication of transferee federal law in these schemes is a natural re-
sult of the allowance of permanent transfers.. Such transfers always 
have the potential to change results with respect to federal issues, 
and MDL cases should be no different. Unless and until Congress 
sees fit to adopt a scheme providing for permanent MDL transfers, 
however, the MDL Act should be seen as preserving the traditional 
choice of law framework with as little impact as possible on the 
results in transferred cases. The discomfort that MDL courts have 
in applying the law of their own circuits is demonstrated by the fact 
that such courts continue to give some respect, although less than 
dispositive signifi.cance, to the law of the transferor circuit court.289 
One might question the above analysis based on the substantive 
powers given to MDL courts prior to remand. Some have argued 
that the MDL court lacks the power to effect permanent transfers 
pursuant to section 1404(a)290 or make substantive rulings because 
the MDL Act was principally designed to allow consolidation of 
discovery proceedings.291 The courts have soundly rejected this po-
sition.292 It is contrary to the language of the MDL Act, which 
Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. & Kenneth D. Sibley, Beyond Diversity: Federal Multiparty, Mul-
tiforum Jurisdiction, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 7, 23-28 (1986). The authors of these proposals do 
not consider the effect of their plans on choice of federal law, but they advocate altering the 
Klaxon rule with respect to state law litigation. See Brackin, supra note 198, at 707; Rowe & 
Sibley, supra, at 37-41. 
289. See In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept 1, 1983, 829 F.2d 1171, 1176 (D.C. Cir. 
1987) (suggesting that the law rif the transferor circuit warrants "close consideration"), affd. 
sub nom. Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122 (1989); In re Donald J. Trump Casino 
Sec. Litig., 793 F. Supp. 543, 548 (D.NJ. 1992), affd., 7 F.3d 357 (3d Cir.1993), cert. denied, 
114 S. Ct. 1219 (1994); Isaac v. Life Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 749 F. Supp. 855, 863 (E.D. 
Tenn. 1990). 
290. See Cooper, supra note 24, at 1159-64 (arguing that the language and legislative 
history of§ 1407 preclude transfer decisions by the MDL court); Cooney, supra note 280, at 
606 (arguing that MDL courts lack the power to effect permanent transfers because the MDL 
Act requires a remand of all cases that are not terminated during pretrial proceedings); 
Rhodes, supra note 280, at 734-42 (arguing that the language and legislative history of§ 1407 
preclude transfer decisions by the MDL court). 
291. See Cooney, supra note 280, at 596, 601-02 (arguing that MDL courts have the 
power to make substantive rulings only as 111J. adjunct to the discovery process and do not 
have the power to make summary judgment rulings after the completion of discovery). 
292. It is now well established that the MDL court has the power to effect permanent 
transfers. See, e.g., Eckstein v. Balcor Fiim Investors, 8 F.3d 1121, 1124 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. 
denied, 114 S. Ct 883 (1994); Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 504 F.2d 400, 402 (7th Cir. 
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975); Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 447 F.2d 122, 124-25 (2d Cir. 
1971); In re Air Crash at Detroit Metro. Airport, Detroit, Mich. on Aug. 16, 1987, 791 F. 
Supp. 1204, 1209 (E.D. Mich. 1992); In re Bristol Bay Salmon Fishery, Alaska, Antitrust 
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gives the MDL court the power to conduct coordinated "pretrial" 
proceedings, not merely discovery proceedings.293 MDL courts 
should have the power to effect permanent transfers because, as 
Part m demonstrates, such transfers change the federal law appli-
cable to the case. Therefore, transfer decisions should be made as 
early in the case as practicable and should not be postponed until 
the case is remanded. 
MDL judges should have the, power to rule on substantive mo-
tions because there is an inherent connection between discovery 
rulings and other pretrial rulings. For example, when jurisdictional 
questions are at issue, courts often limit discovery to such issues and 
allow broader discovery to proceed only after they determine that 
jurisdiction exists.294 Rule 12(b)(6) motions must be determined at 
the outset of cases so that the parties will know with regard to what 
claims. their discovery is relevant.295 Prohibiting the MDL court 
from dealing with such pretrial matters would substantially limit the 
efficacy of consolidated discovery proceedings. 
The MDL judge's power to decide dispositive substantive issues, 
however, does not imply that Congress intended MDL transfers to 
have outcome-determinative effects. As long as the MDL court ap-
plies the law of the ultimate trial forum to all pretrial matters, there 
are no outcome-determinative effects. Because it is possible to al-
low MDL judges substantive powers without affecting outcomes, 
the choice of law problem must be resolved on 'the basis of in-
dependent considerations.296 As demonstrated above, these con-
Litig., 424 F. Supp. 504, 507 (J.P.M.L. 1976). MDL courts also have the power to entertain 
substantive motions. See, e.g., Eckstein, 8 F.3d at 1124 (motion to dismiss); In re Donald J, 
Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 7 F.3d 357, 364 (3d Cir. 1993) (same), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1219 
(1994); Korean Air Lines, 829 F.2d at 1172 (motion for partial summary judgment); Zinser v. 
Continental Grain Co., 660 F.2d 754, 757 (10th Cir. 1981) (motion to dismiss), cert. denied, 
455 U.S. 941 (1982); Berry Petroleum Co. v. Adams & Peck, 518 F.2d 402, 406 n.5 (2d Cir. 
1975) (same); Humphreys v. Tann, 487 F.2d 666, 668 (6th Cir. 1973) (summary judgment 
motion), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 956 (1974); Reidinger v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 463 F.2d 
1017, 1018 n.2 (6th Cir. 1972) (same); Sentner v. Amtrak, 540 F. Supp. 557, 558 & n.2 (D.NJ. 
1982) (motion to amend pleadings to add a punitive damages claim). The JPML is empow-
ered to promulgate rules governing MDL cases as long as these rules are "not inconsistent 
with Acts of Congress and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." 28 U.S.C. § 1407(f) (1988). 
Rule 14 of the MDL Rules, which governs remand of MDL cases, expressly contemplates 
that the MDL judge has the power to grant permanent transfers and dismiss claims on the 
merits, including the power to dismiss claims on summary judgment. See R.~. Juo. PANEL 
MULTIDISTRicr Lmo. 14(a)-(b), reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 1407 note (1988) • 
. 293. 28U.S.C.§1407(a) (1988). 
294. See Cooney, supra note 280, at 602 (arguing that MDL courts have the power to 
decide threshold legal questions to narrow the scope of discovery). 
295. See Rhodes, supra note 280, at 725 (arguing that MDL judges should decide dismis-
sal motions before "forg[ing] ahead with discovery"). 
296. The fact that there is no inconsistency between the broad pretrial powers granted to 
MDL judges and the application of transferee federal law is demonstrated by Judge Weigel's 
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siderations support the application of transferor federal law in 
MDL cases. 
B. Attempts to Reduce the Efficiency Costs of Applying 
Transferee Law 
The proponents of the rule that transferee federal law should 
apply in the MDL context recognize that such a rule has the poten-
tial to waste substantial judicial resources if the decisions of the 
MDL court are reexamined after remand. They argue that this effi-
ciency cost is not high for two reasons. First, most cases terminate 
in the MDL forum and are never remanded to the original forum. 
Second, if a remand is required, the law of the case doctrine will 
protect the rulings made during the MDL stage of the case. As 
demonstrated below, these arguments do not justify departing from 
the view that transferor federal law should apply in MDL cases. 
1. Likelihood of Remand 
The MDL Act does not require a remand to the original forum 
if the case terminates in the MDL court or is permanently trans-
ferred during pretrial proceedings.297 As a practical matter, over 
seventy percent of all MDL cases never return to their original fora 
for trial.298 Thus, the potential waste of judicial resources seems 
confined to about one-quarter of the cases transferred by the 
JPML.299 Consequently, the proponents of the Korean Air Lines 
support of both propositions. See Weigel, supra note 272, at 581-83 (arguing that MDL 
judges have the power to effect permanent transfers and to decide dispositive pretrial mo-
tions, including "motions for judgment approving a settlement, for dismissal, for judgment on 
the pleadings, for summary judgment, for involuntary dismissal under Rule 41(b) ... and to 
quash service of process" (footnotes omitted)); id. at 584 & n.70 ("[T]he transferee court 
must consider the impact of its decisions if and when the transferred cases are returned to the 
originating courts for trial. And the transferee court must apply the substantive law of the 
transferor forum •.•• " (footnote omitted)). Among the cases cited by Judge Weigel on the 
choice of law issue are the Plumbing Fixtures and Philadelphia Housing Authority cases that 
initially established the rule that transferor federal law applies in MDL cases. See id. at n.70; 
supra section 11.A.2. 
297. See, e.g., Zinser v. Continental Grain Co., 660 F.2d 754, 762 (10th Cir. 1981) (holding 
that the district court did not err in refusing to remand cases that were dismissed on the 
merits), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 941 (1982); see also Cooney, supra note 280, at 607-08 
("[T]ransferee courts have usually attempted to decide all substantive issues in the 
litigation."). , 
298. See In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 829 F.2d 1171, 1176 n.9 (D.C. 
Cir. 1987) (citing authority showing that as of June 1986 about 73% of MDL cases had termi-
nated in the MDL court), affd. sub nom Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122 (1989); 
Diana E. Murphy, Unified and Consolidated Complaints in Multidistrict Litigation, 132 
F.R.D. 597, 603 & n.3 (1991) (noting that as of June 1990 about 20% of MDL cases had been 
remanded); Steinman, supra note 258, at 700 & n.411 (noting that as of June 1985 about 22% 
of MDL cases had been remanded). 
299. See Korean Air Lines, 829 F.2d at 1176 n.9; Marcus, supra note 17, at 6~1. 
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result argue that transferee federal law should apply in MDL pro-
ceedings because the application of transferor federal law has effi-
ciency costs of its own. 300 
This analysis is flawed for four reasons. First, the empirical re-
sults demonstrate that a substantial number of cases are re-
manded.301 In the approximately twenty-five percent of MDL cases 
that are remanded, the potential waste of judicial resources is 
large.302 As demonstrated below, the costs of applying transferor 
federal law in the MDL context, though not negligible, are small by 
comparison. As a result, there is no reason to tolerate the costs 
associated with the need to reexamine previously decided ques-
tions, even in the one-quarter of MDL cases that are remanded. 
Second, the proponents of the Korean Air Lines rule have un-
derestimated the relative efficiency cost in remanded cases because 
they have examined the wrong universe of cases in arguing that the 
cost of the rule is limited to about twenty-five percent of MDL 
cases. The total universe of cases against which the remanded cases 
are compared should exclude cases that are permanently trans-
ferred to the MDL court pursuant to section 1404(a). If a case is 
permanently transferred to the MDL court, MDL choice of law 
rules are irrelevant. As demonstrated in Part III, the law of the 
MDL circuit should then apply because this circuit is the ultimate 
appellate venue. MDL choice of law rules are relevant only in 
cases that have the potential to return to their original venue or are 
permanently transferred to a third venue outside the MDL cir-
cuit.303 In comparing efficiency gains and losses from the compet-
ing choice of law rules, we must examine the universe of cases in 
which the selection of a choice of law rule has relevance, not the 
universe of all MDL cases. 
Third, the total universe of cases against which the percentage 
of remanded cases should be compared should also exclude cases 
that terminated prior to any significant legal proceedings in the 
MDL court.304 For example, many cases can be expected to termi-
300. See infra section IV.C. 
301. See Cooper, supra note 24, at 1159. 
302. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 229-32, 268-69. 
303. To the extent that cases are permanently transferred during coordinated pretrial 
proceedings to a circuit other than that in which the cases arose or in which the MDL court 
sits, the law of the ultimate transferee forum should apply during the MDL proceedings, as 
demonstrated in Part III. 
304. One commentator suggests that we should eliminate from the universe of total MDL 
cases all cases that are terminated by voluntary dismissal, settlement, and procedural irregu-
larities. See Cooper, supra note 24, at 1159. Although this commentator assumes that no 
substantive rulings are made in such cases, see id. at 1159 n.124, this conclusion is inaccurate. 
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nate in the MDL court as a result of voluntary settlement.3os To the 
extent that these settlements occurred before the onset of signifi-
cant legal proceedings, the relative efficiency costs of the competing 
choice of law rules have no relevance, and these cases should be 
eliminated from the analysis.306 
Fourth, the Korean Air Lines rule affects more than the twenty-
five percent of cases that are ultimately remanded. If transferee 
federal law applies in the MDL context, some cases will be dis-
missed that would not have been dismissed in the original forum. 
Thus, applying transferee law will affect settlement value. Because 
the MDL scheme adopted by Congress suggests that Congress did 
not intend MDL transfers to have outcome-determinative effects, 
the Korean Air Lines rule is subject to challenge on more than just 
efficiency grounds. 
The fact that termination in the MDL court precludes a remand 
represents a glitch in the statutory scheme. If an MDL district 
court grants a dispositive motion dismissing an entire case, an ap-
peal lies from the final judgment to the court of appeals that super-
vises the MDL court.307 If this circuit court affirms the dismissal, 
the case terminates in the MDL venue and is never remanded to 
the original forum. This result poses a number of problems for the 
position that MDL courts should apply transferor federal law. 
For example, any number of rulings can be made prior to settlement. To the extent that these 
rulings are made pursuant to transferee federal law in the MDL court, the efficiency costs 
associated with the application of transferor federal law are avoided and there are no costs 
associated with the application of transferee federal law. The only cases that should be elimi-
nated from the analysis are those that are in fact terminated prior to any substantive 
proceedings. 
305. See Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 447 F.2d 122, 123 (2d Cir. 1971); In re Four Seasons Sec. 
Laws Litig., 370 F. Supp. 219, 227 n.12 (W.D. Okla. 1974); Donald J. McLachlan, The Mul-
tidistrict Litigation Act: The Demise of Venue, 49 Cm. B. REc. 367, 369 (1968) (noting that 
out of the hundreds of consolidated price-fixing cases that inspired the MDL Act, "only a 
handful resulted in trial and only five went to judgment"). 
306. One might also eliminate from the total universe of MDL cases those cases in which 
no conflict exists between the MDL and transferor circuits. In this circumstance, the compet-
ing choice oflaw rules are also irrelevant. Were we to take this approach, however, we would 
also have to eliminate remanded cases in which no circuit conflict existed. Because there is 
no reason to believe that cases without a federal law conflict terminate or survive termination 
disproportionately in the MDL court, this factor can probably be ignored. 
307. See In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 829 F.2d 1171, 1180 (D.C. Cir. 
1987) (D.H. Ginsburg, J., concurring), affd. sub nom. Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 
U.S. 122 (1989); Glasstech, Inc. v. AB Kyro OY, 769 F.2d 1574, 1576-78 (Fed. Cir. 1985); 
Astarte Shipping Co. v. Allied Steel & Export Serv., 767 F.2d 86, 87 (5th Cir. 1985); In re 
Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 662 F.2d 875, 880 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Eckstein v. Balcer 
Fiim Investors, 740 F. Supp. 572, 574-75 (E.D. WIS. 1990); In re Exterior Siding & Aluminum 
Coil Litig., 538 F. Supp. 45, 48 (D. Minn.), mandamus denied, 705 F.2d 980 (8th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 464 U.S. 866 (1983); Marcus, supra note 17, at 682; Cooney, supra note 280, at 591. 
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Because the case is not remanded, there are no efficiency costs 
attendant to the MDL district and circuit courts' applying their own 
law. By contrast? the efficiency concerns inherent in the application 
of transferor federal law, though small, remain.308 Especially signif-
icant is the lack of any opportunity to have the transferor circuit 
pass on the content of its own law. Moreover, the appellate model 
suggests that the ultimate venue of appeal determines the applica-
ble federal law. In this class of cases, the final appellate venue at 
the circuit court level lies in the MDL circuit. 
However, applying transferee circuit law in this context poses its 
own problems. Determining the final appellate venue depends on 
the substantive result in the MDL circuit court. If the MDL circuit 
court affirms the judgment of dismissal, it is the ultimate appellate 
venue and the .case is never remanded. But if the MDL circuit 
court reyerses the judgment and holds that the MDL district court 
erred in dismissing the complaint, the case will be remanded to the 
original forum for trial and an appeal to the transferor circuit. 
Choice of federal law cannot be made to depend on the substantive 
result in the transferee circuit court. 
Applying transferee law also distinguishes irrationally between 
final and interlocutory judgments. In our hypothetical, if the plain-
tiff asserts a section 14(a) claim based solely on allegations of negli-
gence, MDL courts applying the Sixth Circuit's scienter 
requirement would dismiss this claim, and no remand would be re-
quired. If the complaint alleges both negligence and scienter, how-
ever, dismissing the negligence count does not prevent the case 
from being remanded for trial, with any appeal following trial oc-
curring in the Second Circuit.309 
Applying transferee federal law when the MDL circuit court is 
the final appellate venue also unfairly favors defendants. If the de-
fendant succeeds in getting an entire complaint dismissed in the 
courts of the MDL circuit, this result is final and not subject to reex-
amination. If the MDL courts permit the plaintiff to proceed, how-
ever, the defendant gets a second bite at the apple after remand. 
Thus, the defendant wins if the courts in either circuit are convinced 
to dismiss the case. The plaintiff must win in both circuits to be 
allowed to try the case. 
308. See infra section IV.C. 
309. A judgment is not final and appealable unless it disposes of all the claims between 
all the parties to the litigation. See FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b); see also infra note 314 and accom-
panying text. 
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Consistency with the rest of the MDL scheme requires that the 
MDL district and circuit courts apply transferor federal law even in 
cases that will not be remanded. Congress would do well to remedy 
this glitch in the legislative scheme. To solve this problem, Con-
gress should amend the MDL Act to provide that after the conclu-
sion of pretrial proceedings, courts shall remand all cases to their 
original fora unless they have been permanently transferred as part 
of the MDL proceedings. 
2. Law of the Case 
Because the argument based on the possibility that cases will 
not be remanded is weak, the proponents of the application of 
transferee federal law in the MDL context rely on the law of the 
case doctrine to protect decisions in the MDL circuit from reexami-
nation and reversal. According to the law of the case doctrine, pre-
vious decisions in the same case should generally not be 
reexamined.310 Applying transferee federal law in MDL cases in-
volves reduced efficiency costs if the ultimate trial forum and its 
appellate court are required to defer to MDL rulings. 
The law of the case doctrine is insufficient to make the Korean 
Air Lines result acceptable from an efficiency standpoint. Initially, 
the law of the case doctrine applies only between courts of coordi-
nate rank.311 In the context of our hypothetical, unappealed rulings 
by an MDL district court in the Sixth Circuit would be entitled to 
no deference by the Second Circuit after remand. Any other rule 
would insulate the unappealed rulings of the MDL district court 
from any appellate review, a result the federal system cannot toler-
ate.312 A trial judge in the Second Circuit would be unlikely to de-
fer to MDL district court rulings that make appellate reversal 
likely. In this context, the law of the case doctrine does nothing to 
mitigate the efficiency losses flowing from the application of MDL 
circuit law. · 
Recognizing this last conclusion, Judge Douglas H. Ginsburg ar-
gued in a concurring opinion in the Korean Air Lines case that in-
terlocutory appeals should be allowed as a matter of course to the 
MDL circuit court on outcome-determinative federal issues.313 
310. For a discussion of the law of the case doctrine, see Steinman, supra note 258, at 597-
613. 
311. See Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 816 {1988). 
312. See 486 U.S. at 817 ("[A] district court's adherence to law of the case cannot insulate 
an issue from appellate review •..• "). 
313. See In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 829 F.2d 1171, 1180 (D.C. Cir. 
1987) (D.H. Ginsburg, J., concurring), affd. sub nom. Chan v. Korean Airlines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 
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1his practice is open to a number of objections. It violates the final 
judgment rule that is the cornerstone of federal appellate jurisdic-
tion.314 Interlocutory appeals are generally allowed only in excep-
tional circumstances.31s In the MDL context, the most important 
exception to the final judgment rule involves the district court's 
ability to certify a nonfinal disposition for interlocutory appeal, 
which the court of appeals has the discretion to accept or deny.316 
Federal appellate courts have allowed discretionary interlocutory 
appeals only sparingly.311 
The final judgment rule reflects a congressional desire to pre-
vent the delays inherent in piecemeal appellate litigation.318 It 
reduces the number of appellate issues because the winning party 
has no need to appeal319 and, after the conclusion of a lengthy trial 
process, only the most significant errors are worthy of appeal and 
reversal.320 Nothing in the MDL Act suggests that Congress in-
122 {1989). Interlocutory appeals from decisions of the MDL court are to its own court of 
appeals. See, e.g., Glasstech, Inc. v. AB Kyro OY, 769 F.2d 1574, 1576·78 (Fed. Cir. 1985); 
Astarte Shipping Co. v. Allied Steel & Export Serv., 767 F.2d 86, 87 {5th Cir. 1985); In re 
Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 662 F.2d 875, 880 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Eckstein v. Balcor 
Film Investors, 740 F. Supp. 572, 574-75 (E.D. Wis. 1990); In re Exterior Siding & Aluminum 
Coil Litig., 538 F. Supp. 45, 48 (D. Minn.), mandamus denied, 105 F.2d 980 (8th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 464 U.S. 866 (1983). This rule is consistent with the notion that after a § 1407 transfer 
the MDL court has exclusive jurisdiction over the case. See Eckstein, 140 F. Supp. at 575. 
One commentator has recently supported an expanded use of the interlocutory appeals 
mechanism in mass tort cases. See Michael E. Solimine, Revitalizing Interlocutory Appeals in 
the Federal Courts, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1165, 1205-09 {1990). 
314. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 {1988). A judgment is final if it ends the litigation on the merits 
and leaves nothing but execution to be completed. Lauro Lines S.R.L. v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 
495, 497 (1989). A judgment is final only if it disposes of all claims between all parties to a 
litigation. See FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b). The district court has the power to deem final a sepa· 
rate judgment that disposes of one or more but less than all of the claims between the parties. 
See FED. R. CIV. P. 54{b). There have occasionally been proposals to eliminate appeals as of 
right even from final judgments in civil cases. See, e.g., Carleton M. Crick, The Final Judg-
ment Rule as a Basis for Appeal, 41 YALE LJ. 539 {1932) (arguing that appeals should be 
allowed only in the discretion of the appellate court); cf. Irving Wilner, Civil Appeals: Are 
They Useful in the Administration of Justice?, 56 GEO. LJ. 417 (1968) (questioning the value 
of appellate review). 
315. See Robert J. Martineau, Defining Finality and Appealability by Court Rule: Right 
Problem, Wrong Solution, 54 U. Prrr. L. REv. 717, 729.47 (1993) (examining the exceptions 
to the final judgment rule). 
316. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) {1988). 
317. See Milbert v. Bison Lab., Inc., 260 F.2d 431, 433 {3d Cir. 1958) (supporting the 
limitation of interlocutory appeals to "exceptional cases"); Martineau, supra note 315, at 733· 
34 {discussing how courts have restricted interlocutory appeals to "big, exceptional" cases); 
Solimine, supra note 313, at 1193-99 (same). 
318. See, e.g., Firestone Ttre & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374 {1981); Solimine, 
supra note 313, at 1168 ("Powerful efficiency arguments support limiting appeals to final 
judgments."). 
319. See Solimine, supra note 313, at 1168. 
320. It is worth noting that to some extent the final judgment rule values the time of 
appellate courts more than the time of trial courts. The final judgment rule requires the trial 
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tended to alter the normal rules of appellate jurisdiction in the 
MDL context.321 Moreover, although Judge Ginsburg assumes that 
outcome-determinative issues will be small in number, this result is 
hardly obvious.322 
Judge Ginsburg's interlocutory appeals solution is also incom-
plete. Because he recognizes that interlocutory appeals cann~t be 
provided on all issues decided by the MDL district court, Judge 
Ginsburg restricts the category of issues entitled to such appeals to 
outcome-determinative issues. As a consequence, on many issues 
the decisions of the MDL district court must be subject to reexami-
nation and reversal after remand. The incomplete nature of Judge 
Ginsburg's scheme leads to the anomalous result that the law of 
different circuits will apply to different issues in the same case: 
MDL circuit law will apply to outcome-determinative issues - as-
suming that after remand the transferor circuit court accords law of 
the case status to decisions of the MDL circuit court - and trans-
feror circuit law will apply after remand on issues that were not 
deserving of an interlocutory appeal. Nothing in the MDL Act or 
common sense sanctions such a schizophrenic result.323 
Judge Ginsburg's interlocutory appeals solution might also be 
difficult to apply. In some guises, the standard of fault applicable to 
a section 14(a) claim would be outcome determinative. For exam-
ple, if the plaintiff alleges negligence alone, the entire case turns on 
-the standard of fault issue. On the other hand, if the plaintiff also 
court to hold trials that may tum out after an appeal to have been unnecessary or to retry 
cases that the appellate court later finds were tainted with significant error. A contrary rule 
is neither unthinkable nor obviously inefficient For example, New York allows an appeal as 
of right from all interlocutory judgments and most interlocutory orders. See N.Y. CIV. PRAc. 
L. & R. § 570l{a){l)-(2) (McKinney 1978). New York does so because it values the time of 
trial courts more than the time of appellate courts. See also Solimine, supra note 313, at 
1178-80 (supporting an increase in the number of federal interlocutory appeals to conserve 
the trial court's resources). 
321. See, e.g., Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. LeMay, 448 F.2d 1341, 1343-45 {7th Cir.) (refus-
ing to entertain an interlocutory appeal in an MDL case because the appropriate venue for 
appeal is in the transferor circuit after final judgment), cerL denied, 404 U.S. 1001 (1971). 
322. See In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept 1, 1983, 829 F.2d 1171, 1180 (D.C. Cir. 
1987) (D.H. Ginsburg, J., concurring) (arguing that interlocutory appeals are available in 
MDL cases to resolve "those few outcome-determinative rulings of the transferee district 
court"), affd. sub nom. Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122 (1989). Judge Gins-
burg's assumption is especially questionable because he means to allow interlocutory appeals 
on all federal issues with a substantial impact on the outcome rather than merely dispositive 
issues. See infra text accompanying note 324. 
323. Although courts often use depei;age to designate different state law to govern differ-
ent issues in the same case, see Brackin, supra note 198, at 674 & n.87, this result arises from 
the need to accommodate the competing interests of a number of sovereigns, which may vary 
depending on the issue. See id. at 674. Because such sovereignty concerns are irrelevant in 
the federal system, the federal courts have no reason to utilize such a confusing procedure 
with respect to federal issues. 
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alleges scienter, the decision is not necessarily outcome determina-
tive. In this regard, it is worth noting that Korean Air Lines itself 
did not involve a dispositive issue. Whether Korean Air Lines was 
entitled to avail itself of the damage limitation provisions of an in-
ternational treaty governed the scope of its potential exposure but 
did not definitively resolve any pending claims. Because Judge 
Ginsburg supported an interlocutory appeal on this issue, one must 
assume that he also means to allow interlocutory appeals on signifi-
cant nondispositive issues.324 
Perhaps significant nondispositive issues will seldom need to be 
decided in the MDL court. The core job of the MDL court, how-
ever, is presiding over consolidated discovery. Discovery in federal 
court is confined to relevant evidence or evidence that is likely to 
lead to relevant evidence.325 Relevance is determined according to 
what the substantive law defines as the elements of the plaintiff's 
claims and the defendant's defenses. Even if discovery is relevant, 
a discovery judge has the power to grant protective orders.326 
Many of these discovery decisions cannot be made without address-
ing central substantive issues in the case. 
The law of the case solution to the efficiency concerns attendant 
to applying MDL circuit law is also problematic because the law of 
the case doctrine is far from absolute. All interlocutory decisions 
are subject to reexamination prior to final judgment.327 Although 
the law of the case doctrine provides a fully sufficient reason for 
refusing to reexamine decisions made at an earlier stage in the case, 
it does not always prohibit such reexamination.328 Among the well-
recognized exceptions to the law of the case doctrine are rulings 
viewed as clearly erroneous.329 Decisions that are clearly contrary 
to the precedents of the ultimatfi appellate forum would qualify as 
manifestly erroneous and jus~ departure from law of the case 
principles.33o In our hypothetjcal, if a plaintiff brought a section 
324. See Korean Air Lines, 829 F.2d at 1180 (D.H. Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
325. See FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b){l). 
326. See FED. R. Crv. P. 26(c). 
327. See FED. R. Crv. P. 54{b). 
328. See Arizona v. Califomfa, 460 U.S. 605, 618 (1983) ("Law of the case directs a 
court's discretion, it does not limit the tribunal's power."). 
329. See, e.g., Arizona, 460 U.S. at 618 n.8; Robinson v. Parrish, 720 F.2d 1548, 1550 n.• 
(11th Cir. 1983); Hill v. BASF Wyandotte Corp., 696 F.2d 287, 290 n.3 (4th Cir. 1982); Crane 
Co. v. American Standard, Inc., 603 F.2d 244, 248 (2d Cir. 1979). 
330. See Steinman, supra note 258, at 704 (noting that to the extent MDL transferor 
courts have jurisdiction to reexamine decisions in the MDL circuit and apply their own law 
on remand, such courts are permitted to depart from law of the case principles with respect 
to decisions that are contrary to transferor circuit law). 
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14(a) claim founded on both negligence and scienter and an MDL 
court in Ohio dismissed the negligence counts, the Sixth Circuit 
would affirm on interlocutory appeal. Because the scienter counts 
remain, however, the case would be remanded to a district court in 
New York for trial. On appeal from the final judgment, the Second 
Circuit would probably refuse to defer to the Sixth Circuit with re-
gard to the dismissal of the negligence claim because, based on ex-
isting Second Circuit precedent, this decision is manifestly an error. 
Finally, it bears noting that at the circuit court level the law of 
the case doctrine is often honored more in the breach than in the 
observance. To take but one stark example, the Supreme Court has 
twice been faced with confiic~ing appellate decisions in the transfer 
context. In both cases, an appellate court in the original forum pro-
vided for the transfer of a case to another circuit. In both cases, the 
transferee appellate court transferred the case back to its original 
venue. The first time the Supreme Court faced the issue of federal 
appellate courts playing this elaborate game of procedural ping 
pong, it suggested that the discretionary aspects of the law of the 
case doctrine permitted this result. 331 The second time it faced the 
issue, the Supreme Court suggested that the second appellate court 
should ordinarily defer to the first in the interest of procedural har-
mony.332 The latter Supreme Court decision surely expresses the 
better view. But if federal circuit courts are uncomfortable in ac-
cepting transfer results from other circuit courts, which present the 
strongest case for deference, one should be sanguine regarding the 
likelihood of deference on other issues when the ultimate appellate 
court has the ability to have the last word at the circuit court 
level.333 
Although I do not believe that the law of the case doctrine satis-
factorily resolves the efficiency concerns inherent in applying trans-
feree federal law in MDL cases, I do not mean to suggest that the 
331. See Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 340 n.9 (1960). 
332. See Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 818-19 (1988). 
333. The difficulty with assuming that the law of the case doctrine will insulate MDL 
circuit rulings after remand is demonstrated by the fact that Judge Ginsburg, who made this 
assumption, see In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 829 F.2d 1171, 1180-81 
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (D.H. Ginsburg, J., concurring), affd. sub nom. Chan v. Korean Air Lines, 
Ltd., 490 U.S. 122 {1989), also believes that for the MDL scheme to work properly, Congress 
should amend the statute "to provide that rulings by a court in one circuit will not be re-
viewed under the case law of another circuit," 829 F.2d at 1184-85. As suggested above, the 
preferable way to resolve potential appellate confiicts would be to require the MDL courts to 
apply transferor law and provide that all MDL cases shall be remanded so that the transferor 
circuit always has ultimate appellate jurisdiction. See supra text accompanying notes 307-09. 
According to this approach, interlocutory appeals would be rare, and confiicts between ap-
pellate courts would be kept to a minimum. 
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law of the case doctrine has no role to play in such cases. As long 
as the MDL judge makes an honest effort to apply the law of the 
transferor court of appeals, after remand the trial judge has no 
more cause to reexamine these interlocutory decisions than if they 
had been made by another judge on his court. If the MDL circuit 
decides an interlocutory appeal in accordance with the transferor 
circuit's law, after remand the transferor circuit should accord this 
decision substantial deference just as it would an interlocutory deci-
sion by a different panel of its own court. This process is faithful to 
the MDL Act's assumption that transfers do not change applicable 
federal law as well as the efficiency concerns that motivate the law 
of the case doctrine. 334 
Moreover, discovery decisions by the MDL trial and appellate 
courts should be treated with substantial deference after remand. 
Conducting consolidated discovery is at the core of the MDL func-
tion and involves substantial discretion. Discretionary decisions 
present a strong claim for application of the law of the case doc-
trine.335 Parties challenging discovery rulings on an interlocutory 
basis have had some success in surmounting the final judgment 
rule.336 The courts are somewhat more likely to allow interlocutory 
app'eals on discovery questions because the harm of an erroneous 
ruling is often irremediable. When an MDL circuit hears an inter-
locutory appeal on discovery issues that cannot wait until the con-
clusion of the case to be resolved, the transferor circuit should 
rarely revisit such issues. But to preserve the sense of the MDL 
scheme, and in the interest of applying a uniform law to the entire 
cas~, the MDL courts should also apply transferor circuit law to 
discovery questions. 
C. The Costs of Applying Transferor Law 
Proponents of the Korean Air Lines result argue that applying 
transferor federal law to MDL cases has substantial costs and is 
contrary to fundamental assumptions of the federal system. The 
following sections examine these arguments and find them to be 
without substantial merit. 
334. See Sentner v. Amtrak, 540 F. Supp. 557, 558 n.3, 559 n.5 (D.N.J. 1982) (recognizing 
simultaneously that an MDL court is required to follow transferor federal law and that its 
decisions are entitled to law of the case deference on remand). 
335. See Steinman, supra note 258, at 601 ("[S)ome issues, most notably questions of fact 
and matters of discretion, are particularly unsuited for reconsideration •••• "). 
336. See RICHARD H. FIEID ET AL, MATERIALS FOR A BASIC CoURSE IN CIVIL PROCE-
DURE 590-92 {6th ed. 1990). 
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1. Applying the Law of Another Circuit 
Proponents of the Korean Air Lines rule argue that a contrary 
rule imposes unacceptable costs on the MDL district and appellate 
courts in attempting to divine the law of the transferor appellate 
circuit.337 Should the courts adopt the position that transferor fed-
eral law applies in MDL cases, the MDL court would be required to 
predict the law that the transferor circuit court would apply. This 
predictive task is notoriously difficult in the analogous Erie context, 
where federal courts are required to predict the law that the rele-
vant state's highest court would apply.338 Although such practical 
difficulties are inherent in the Erie scheme, they are avoidable in 
the MDL context with respect to federal issues. Applying trans-
feree federal law in the MDL context would eliminate such 
difficulties. 
There are, however, two features that distinguish the MDL fed-
eral issue context from the Erie context. First, a federal MDL court 
is in a far better position to apply transferor circuit law than state 
law.339 Although in some sense both are "foreign law" - that is, 
law the judge does not deal with on a daily basis - MDL judges 
should at least be familiar with the general structure of federal law 
even if they do not know the particular answers provided by the 
transferor circuit. Moreover, an MDL judge would divine the law 
of the transferor circuit just as the transferor district court would 
have: by researching that circuit's relevant precedents. The facility 
of federal judges with the law of other circuits is demonstrated by 
the fact that federal judges often sit by designation on courts of 
appeals outside their home circuits.340 
Second, unlike Erie, the MDL scheme usually provides a 
method to ensure that the MDL judge correctly predicts the law 
that the transferor circuit would apply. After remand and trial, the 
transferor circuit will itself get to pronounce on the correctness of 
337. See Korean Air Lines, 829F.2d1182-83 (D.H. Ginsburg, J., concurring) (arguing that 
it is more difficult for a district judge to apply the law of another circuit than state law); 
Marcus, supra note 17, at 713-14. 
338. See Nolan v. Transocean Air Lines, 276 F.2d 280, 281 (2d Cir. 1960) (Friendly, J.) 
(complaining that "[o]ur principal task, in this diversity of citizenship case, is to determine 
what the New York courts would think the california courts would think on an issue about 
which neither has thought"), vacated per curiam on other grounds, 365 U.S. 293 (1961). 
339. See Fossett Corp. v. Gearhart, 694 F. Supp. 1325, 1328 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (concluding 
that it would be easier "for the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas to apply 
Seventh Circuit precedent than it would be for this court to apply Texas law"). 
340. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 291(a), 292(d) (1988) (giving the Chief Justice of the United States 
the power to designate circuit and district judges for service on courts of appeals outside their 
home circuits). · 
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the decisions of the MDL judge. In the Erie context, it is possible 
to ascertain the position of the relevant state's highest court on dis-
puted issues only in exceptional circumstances.341 As a conse-
quence, the efficiency costs of applying transferor federal law in the 
MDL context are much smaller than the analogous costs in the Erie 
context. 
2. Distinguishing Substance from Procedure 
Requiring the MDL court to apply transferor law presents a sec-
ond problem that has Erie analogies. Courts apply their own law 
on issues of "procedure" based on their inherent duty to regulate 
housekeeping matters in their own courtrooms.342 In the Erie con-
text, distinguishing substance from procedure has been particularly 
vexing.343 The proponents of the Korean Air Lines result argue that 
this problem should not be introduced into federal question trans-
fer cases. 344 
The substance versus procedure problem in the federal issue 
context is not of the same magnitude as in the Erie context because 
all federal courts are required to follow the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Nevertheless, the problem is not insignificant because 
there is still substantial room for disagreement among the circuits 
on procedural matters. Different circuits have different interpreta-
341. See, e.g., Bethpage Lutheran Serv. v. Weiker, 965 F.2d 1239, 1246 (2d Cir. 1992) 
(noting that certification procedures should be used infrequently). 
342. See Steinman, supra note 258, at 630 (noting that the Erie analogy suggests that 
"federal courts having federal question jurisdiction over transferred cases also may use their 
own procedural rules"). 
343. The law in this area seems to have come to an uneasy resting place based on a three-
pronged test that represents a compromise among competing values. Federal law controls 
any issue that lies within the domain of a valid federal statute or rule. See Hanna v. Plumer, 
380 U.S. 460 (1965). If no valid federal statute or rule applies, and an important federal 
policy interest is at stake, the interests of the federal government are balanced against the 
interests of the relevant state government in determining which law to apply. See Byrd v. 
Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958). If no federal statute or rule is 
applicable and no significant federal policy interest is involved, state law applies on all issues 
that are likely to have a significant impact on the outcome of the case. See Guaranty 'Ihlst 
Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945). This uneasy compromise has arisen, in large part, because 
the Supreme Court desired to give greater scope to federal law in diversity cases than Guar-
anty Trust allowed but was unwilling to overrule Guaranty Trust or its progeny. In Hanna, 
the Court created the three-pronged structure that currently reigns to avoid overruling its 
prior cases. Subsequent to Hanna, the Court has continued to refuse to overrule cases from 
the Guaranty Trust era. See Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740 (1980) (refusing to 
overrule Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949)); Day & Zim-
mermann, Inc. v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 3 (1975) (refusing to overrule Klaxon Co. v. Stentor 
Blee. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941)). Avoiding such complexities in federal question cases is 
a consummation devoutly to be wished. 
344. See Marcus, supra note 17, at 714-16. 
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tions of the Federal Rules,345 and each district court is allowed to 
promulgate additional procedural rules to the extent that such rules 
are not inconsistent with the Federal Rules.346 There is, however, 
no guarantee that district courts will promulgate rules that are con-
sistent with each other. Moreover, the circuits have often differed 
on doctrines that flow from sources other than the Federal Rules 
but can be viewed as procedural.347 
In the Erie context, the need to distinguish substance from pro-
cedure arises from the claims of competing sovereigns. The Erie 
decision rests in part on the desire to protect state sovereignty from 
encroachment by a federal government that is supposed to have 
limited powers.348 Later decisions gave federal courts broader 
scope to apply their own law in diversity cases to implement the 
Constitution's enabling clauses and the Supremacy Clause, which 
serve to restrict state sovereignty.349 Because there are no similar 
federalism concerns in the MDL context, there is no need to distin-
guish substance from procedure.350 In the interest of simplicity, a 
single circuit's law should apply to all issues, whether substantive or 
procedural.351 Because efficiency considerations and congressional 
intent suggest that transferor circuit law should apply on substan-
tive questions, there is no reason not to extend this result to the 
procedural context.352 This result eliminates any costs attendant to 
procedure-substance differentiation. 
345. See id. at 715 & n.225 (describing conflicting views on the requirements for class 
action certification under rule 23 and protective orders under rule 26(c)). 
346. See FED. R. CIV. P. 83. 
347. See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 17, at 716 (discussing injunction standards and the doc-
trine of fraudulent concealment in the limitations context). 
348. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-80 (1938). 
349. See supra note 343. 
350. See Dreyfuss, supra note 163, at 38 n.220 (arguing that the "principle of equivalency 
between circuits and states is specious"); Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 221, at 833 ("[I]t 
cannot be plausibly maintained that the courts of appeals have the status of independent 
courts representing an authority sovereign over their geographic territories."); Schaefer, 
supra note 220, at 454 ("There is no element of sovereignty in a federal judicial circuit."); cf. 
Laurie R. Wallach, Note, Intercircuit Conflicts and the Enforcement of Extracircuit Judg-
ments, 95 YALE LJ. 1500, 1501 (1986) (noting "[t]he unique status of circuits - something 
'less' sovereign than states but 'more' than mere coordinate courts"). 
351. For example, although statute of limitations questions can be viewed as either proce-
dural or substantive, see supra note 206, federal courts deciding which circuit's Jaw to apply 
on such questions in the transfer context have generally ignored the procedure-substance 
distinction, see supra note 191. But see Duke v. Touche Ross & Co., 765 F. Supp. 69, 73 
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (treating limitations questions as procedural and applying Jaw of the forum). 
352. The MDL court would, of necessity, retain the power to apply its own rules on 
purely housekeeping matters - for example, the typeface conventions for briefs. Thus, even 
under the regime proposed in the text, the MDL judge would still be required to distinguish 
between procedural matters of a purely housekeeping nature and other procedural matters. 
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3. Reducing the Benefits of Consolidation 
Proponents of the Korean Air Lines result argue that applying 
transferor federal law in MDL cases reduces the benefits of consoli-
dation because the MDL court might have to apply conflicting fed-
eral rules to cases that originated in different circuits.353 There is 
little question that applying transferor law in the MDL circuit does 
reduce the benefits of consolidation. Nevertheless, applying the 
law of several circuits to a single issue does not entirely eliminate 
the benefits of consolidation. It is more efficient for a single court 
to analyze a single problem and then research the answer according 
to the precedents of a number of circuits than for numerous district 
judges to analyze the problem separately under their own circuits' 
laws. 
Moreover, the efficiency of conducting consolidated proceed-
ings has seldom been a paramount goal of the procedural system. 
A number of other rules limit the facility of collective litigation to 
accomplish more significant procedural objectives. The rules of 
subject matter jurisdiction prevent diversity plaintiffs from aggre-
gating their claims to reach the jurisdictional limit.354 Rules of per-
sonal jurisdiction often prevent the consolidation of related 
cases.355 In state law cases, constitutional limitations on state 
choice of law rules inhibit the facility of the class action 
mechanism.356 
Congress's approach to the MDL problem also suggests that 
preserving the law of the transferor forum is a more significant con-
This fact eloquently testifies to the inherent impossibility of eliminating entirely the 
procedure-substance dichotomy. 
353. See Marcus, supra note 17, at 716-19; Murphy, supra note 298, at 608 ("Application 
of the law of the transferor court can be a very complicated process ••• in cases where there 
are transfers from a number of different courts and jurisdictions."). 
354. See Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 {1973). The lower courts are 
divided on whether the new supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367 {1988 & 
Supp. II 1990), has supplanted Zahn. Compare, e.g., Patterson Enters., Inc. v. Bridgestone/ 
Firestone, Inc., 812 F. Supp. 1152, 1154 (D. Kan. 1993) (holding that § 1367 overrules Zahn) 
with Averdick v. Republic Fm. Servs., Inc., 803 F. Supp. 37, 45-46 (E.D. Ky. 1992) {holding 
that Zahn survives § 1367). 
355. Prior to the enactment of the federal interpleader statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1335 {1988) 
(originally enacted as Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 1335, 62 Stat. 869, 931), obligors were 
often unable to join competing claimants in a single action. See, e.g., New York Life Ins. Co. 
v. Dunlevy, 241 U.S. 518, 521-22 {1916). 
356. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 821-22 {1985) (holding that a state 
court could not apply its own law to thousands of related cases in the class action context 
because it lacked a " 'significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts' " to some of 
the cases (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 313 {1981) {plurality opinion))). 
For an analysis of Phillips's impact on class actions, see Arthur R. Miller & David Crump, 
Jurisdiction and Choice of Law after Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 96 YALE LJ. 1, 57-67 
(1986). 
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cem than preserving inviolate the benefits of MDL consolidation. 
By providing for a return of cases to their original fora for trial, 
Congress indicated that achieving uniformity of results was not 
among its most important goals. As demonstrated above, the MDL 
Act involved consolidation for limited purposes principally related 
to discovery and was not intended to have outcome-determinative 
effects. Indeed, on state law issues, the Van Dusen rule often pre-
cludes the application of a single law to MDL cases.357 I see no 
reason to distinguish the federal law ·MDL context from others in 
which the efficiency concerns inherent in consolidated litigation are 
secondary to more significant procedural concems.358 
4. Departing from the Principle of Competence 
Perhaps the most significant charge against the application of 
transferor federal law in the MDL context is theoretical rather than 
practical. Whereas the appellate model incorporates Marcus's com-
petence principle in the permanent transfer context, it is in conflict 
with this principle in the MDL context. The appellate model pre-
cludes the MDL court, and its circuit court, from applying their best 
views of federal law in light of the pronouncements of Congress and 
the Supreme Court. The appellate model requires the MDL courts 
to defer to the views of the transferor circuit. · 
The competence principle contains two elements: the ability 
and the duty of federal judges to determine federal law correctly. 
The first element is essentially a tautology. By definition, all Amer-
ican courts, including state courts, have the ability to determine fed-
eral law correctly. The second element is arguable.359 In cases that 
are not transferred, according to the currently prevailing view, the 
357. See, e.g., In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 745 F. Supp. 79, 81 (D.P.R. 
1990) (noting that in mass tort litigation, "the application of choice of law standards turns 
into a colossal struggle for the transferee court"); In re Paris Air Crash of Mar. 3, 1974, 399 F. 
Supp. 732, 740 (C.D. Cal. 1975) (commenting on the" 'judicial nightmare known as Conflicts 
of Laws' " in an MDL mass tort proceeding (quoting Forsyth v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 520 F .2d 
608, 609 (9th Cir. 1975) (emphasis added))); Symeon C. Symeonides, The ALi's Complex 
Litigation Project: Commencing the National Debate, 54 LA. L REv. 843, 853 (1994) ("[T]he 
existing system seems to be very near the crashing point under the combined weight of Erie, 
Klaxon, Van Dusen, and Ferens." (footnotes omitted)); Weinberg, supra note 205, at 710 & 
n.156 (arguing that "Van Dusen, for consolidated cases in federal court .•. ha[s] produced 
what writers today quite rightly call 'mass litigation disaster,' " and collecting authorities). 
358. See In re Dow Co. "Sarabond" Prods. Liab. Litig., 666 F. Supp. 1466, 1470 (D. Colo. 
1987) (perceiving "a great deal of sense in applying the law of a single forum to all § 1407 
issues (whether state or federal) so that the advantages of multidistrict litigation may be 
pursued to their logical conclusions," but applying transferor federal law based on the cur-
rent MDL scheme). 
359. See Fmi, supra note 25, at 80 (noting that the "competence principle is not helpful 
because Van Dusen does not speak to competence; rather, it speaks to appropriateness"). 
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benefits of intercircuit dialogue justify the competence principle at 
the circuit court level. For cases that are permanently transferred, 
there is no reason to depart from the competence principle and, as 
Part ill demonstrates, substantial reason to support it. 
Moreover, the competence principle is not absolute within the 
federal system. In 1982, Congress created the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.360 This court primarily361 has 
jurisdiction over appeals when the jurisdiction of a federal district 
court is founded in whole or in part on 28 U.S.C. § 1338, which 
provides for original subject matter jurisdiction over patent 
cases.362 The Federal Circuit has held that it also has appellate ju-
risdiction over nonpatent issues in cases that are otherwise \vithin 
its appellate jurisdiction.363 On federal nonpatent issues, however, 
the Federal Circuit applies the federal law of the regional circuit 
within which the district court sits.364 This practice enables the Fed-
eral Circuit to create the national patent law that Congress envi-
sioned,365 avoid piecemeal appeals in patent cases, and avoid 
changing the results on nonpatent issues that would never have 
come before the Federal Circuit had there been no patent questions 
in the case. 
Just as the Federal Circuit has departed from the competence 
principle to achieve other goals of the federal system, the MDL 
context is sufficiently special to justify departure from this principle. 
Applying transferor federal law in the MDL context furthers sub-
360. See Federal Courts Improvements Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (com-
bining the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and the Court of Claims to create the Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit). 
361. Although the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit's primary significance lies in 
the area of patent appeals, it also hears appeals in a number of other areas. See Dreyfuss, 
supra note 163, at 4. 
362. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(l) (1988). In Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating 
Corp., 486 U.S. 800 (1988), the Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit has appellate jurisdiction in patent cases only when a federal patent issue appears on 
the face of a well-pleaded complaint See 486 U.S. at 807-10. 
363. See, e.g., Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781F.2d861, 875-78 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (enter-
taining an antitrust claim); Bandag, Inc. v. Al Bolser's Tire Stores, Inc., 750 F.2d 903, 907-09 
(Fed. Cir. 1984) (entertaining a trademark claim); Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. 
Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1571-72 (Fed. Cir.1984) (entertaining a disqualification of counsel claim). 
The Federal Circuit also hears appeals within the scope of its appellate jurisdiction in cases 
where no patent issues remain in the case. See Gemveto Jewelry Co. v. Jeff Cooper Inc., 800 
F.2d 256, 258 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (entertaining an appeal when the patent issues in the case 
had been dismissed); Atari, Inc. v. JS & A Group, Inc., 747 F.2d 1422 (Fed. Cir.1984) (enter-
taining an appeal when the patent issues in the case had been severed). 
364. See Atari, 141 F.2d at 1439-40 (applying the rule to substantive issues); Panduit, 144 
F.2d at 1574-75 (applying the rule to procedural issues). This deference has been criticized. 
See Dreyfuss, supra note 163, at 37-46. 
365. See Revesz, supra note 213, at 1167. 
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stantial efficiency concerns and is faithful to Congress's purpose in 
creating the MDL scheme. Moreover, departing from the compe-
tence principle in the MDL context does little injury to the policy 
goal that animates it. The chief purpose of the competence princi-
ple at the appellate level is to encourage intercircuit dialogue.366 
Such dialogue will proceed uninhibited in all but MDL cases and 
accomplish most or all of its objectives. 
It should also be noted that in the MDL context either choice of 
law approach involves some compromise of the competence princi-
ple. The Korean Air Lines approach is premised in part on the ulti-
mate appellate court's willingness to accord law of the case status to 
interlocutory appellate rulings in the MDL circuit. This approach 
precludes the ultimate appellate court from applying its best view of 
federal law. The approach suggested by the appellate model would 
require the MDL court, and its circuit, to apply transferor federal 
law. Because some compromise of the competence principle is re-
quired, the appellate model's approach is preferable because it fur-
thers efficiency goals as well as congressional intent. 
D. Conclusion 
In sum, the appellate model, which posits that the ultimate 
venue of appeal identifies applicable federal law, should apply in 
MDL cases and require the application of transferor federal law. 
This choice of law approach is consistent with the MDL scheme, 
which contemplates the return of cases to their original fora for trial 
and furthers substantial efficiency goals by reducing the number of 
MDL rulings that will have to be reexamined after any remand. 
Attempts to reduce the efficiency costs of a contrary rule are un-
availing. The fact that most MDL cases are not remanded is, by 
itself, of little significance. The law of the case doctrine does not 
eliminate the efficiency costs of applying transferee federal law be-
cause it does not apply to MDL district court rulings, requires inter-
locutory appeals to the MDL circuit, and does not ensure that the 
rulings of the MDL circuit court will be respected after remand. 
Finally, although the appellate model's approach presents some ef-
ficiency costs of its own, these costs are small in comparison to the 
efficiency costs of the Korean Air Lines rule. 
366. See supra text accompanying notes 220-25. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, Professor Marcus, Korean Air Lines, and their 
progeny have arrived at a conclusion that is only half right. The 
current consensus view, that transferee federal law should apply af-
ter all transfers of cases containing federal issues, is right in the con-
text of permanent transfers but wrong in the context of MDL 
transfers. With respect to federal issues, the venue of appeal deter-
mines choice of law by default. Neither the permanent transfer nor 
MDL context presents any reason to depart from this principle. As 
a consequence, transferee federal law should apply after permanent 
transfers, and transferor federal law should apply after MDL trans-
fers. These conclusions reflect the pre-Korean Air Lines consensus 
of the federal courts, to which a return would be welcome. 
The effect of transfer on choice of federal law will probably con-
tinue to be a difficult question for the foreseeable future. Although 
resolution of the choice of law issue is within the Supreme Court's 
province, this issue is peculiarly insulated from Supreme Court re-
view. As Korean Air Lines itself demonstrates, whenever the 
Supreme Court grants certiorari to resolve a conflict among the cir-
cuits, it usually renders the choice of law question moot.367 Once 
the Supreme Court addresses the conflict on the merits, federal law 
becomes uniform. 
Perhaps the Court will exercise its role as supervisor of the 
lower federal courts and provide some advice on the choice of law 
question. For example, in Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating 
Corp.,368 the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict 
relating to the appellate jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit.369 In 
the course of its opinion, the Supreme Court resolved the question 
on the merits.370 It also gave advice to the inferior federal courts on 
the handling of transfer decisions and strongly suggested that fed-
eral appellate courts should accord law of the case status to transfer 
decisions emanating from other circuits. 371 There is no reason the 
Court could not give similar guidance the next time it resolves a 
circuit conflict in the transfer context. 
Given the difficulties surrounding Supreme Court action, Con-
gress is in the best position to resolve the choice of law dilemma. 
367. See supra note 183. 
368. 486 U.S. 800 (1988). 
369. See 486 U.S. at 806-07. 
370. See 486 U.S. at 807-18. 
371. See 486 U.S. at 818-19. 
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The Rules of Decision Act372 is the font of choice of law in the Erie 
context.373 There is no reason that Congress could not legislate the 
federal law applicable to transferred cases. Congress would do well 
to resolve this issue so that cases can proceed based on the express, 
rather than the divined, intent of Congress. At the very least, Con-
gress should amend the MDL Act to provide for a remand of all 
MDL cases at the conclusion of pretrial proceedings, including 
cases that have been terminated on the merits.374 This procedure 
would greatly increase the consistency of the current MDL scheme. 
372. 28 u.s.c. § 1652 (1988). 
373. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); see also Boggs v. Blue Diamond Coal 
Co., 497 F. Supp. 1105, 1109-13 (E.D. Ky. 1980) (discussing the interplay between Erie and 
the Rules of Decision Act). 
374. Cases that have pennanently transferred to the MDL court should be exempt from 
this rule. Cases that have been permanently transferred to other districts pending the com-
pletion of MDL proceedings should be transferred to those districts at the conclusion of the 
pretrial phase. 
